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BILINGUALISM AND EQUALITY: TITLE VII CLAIMS FOR
LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE
James Leonard*
Linguistic diversity is a fact of contemporary American life. Nearly one in five
Americans speak a language other than English in the home, and influxes of
immigrants have been a constant feature of American history. The multiplicity of
languages in American society has touched nearly all aspects of American cul-
ture, and specifically has added new and important challenges to the American
workplace. Chief among these new concerns are the growing number of legal
claims centered around language discrimination in the workplace. The common
vehicle for these claims has been Title VII, and there is considerable support in the
academic literature for the proposition that Title VII should be read to confer a
right on bilingual employees to use a preferred language in the workplace when
English is not necessitated by business or safety concerns.
This Article examines the usefulness of Title WI as a framework to address the
growing number of language discrimination claims, and concludes that Title VII
is an awkwardly adapted vehicle to address these types of workplace concerns. Ti-
tle VII is based on a civil rights model that promotes even-handed treatment of
employees, and does so through methods of proof that reflect a historically in-
formed skepticism about an employer's motivations when dealing with a protected
class of persons. Workplace language rules, in contrast, rarely involve stereotypes
and normally are pertinent to an employer's operations. To confer a right to speak
in a preferred language goes beyond Title VII's mandate of equal treatment and
amounts to the creation of positive rights that are unconnected with equality in
the workplace.
Part I of this Article introduces the reader to the nature of workplace language
claims and their judicial disposition. Part H surveys the language competencies
of Americans, relying primarily on results reported in the in the 2000 Census.
Results indicate a high degree of English proficiency in the United States, indicat-
ing that the key issue in language policy is a bilingual's desire to speak in a
native tongue, rather than providing for masses of persons who can't speak
English. Part III examines the anti-discrimination concepts which underlie Title
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VII, finding that these concepts strongly embody the "civil rights model" which re-
gards characteristics such as race and gender as improper bases for workplace
decisionmaking. Part IV asks whether the civil rights model embodied in Title VII
works with language discrimination claims, concluding that it does not. Lan-
guage is fundamentally different from race, ethnicity, gende, or even national
origin. The characteristics of mutability and relevance take language discrimina-
tion claims outside the realm of Title VI's civil rights model. Part V offers
concluding remarks.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Foreign language" is an obsolescent term in Twenty-First Cen-
tury America. Public Schools continue to impose "foreign
language" requirements while colleges and universities often main-
tain "foreign language" departments. Nevertheless, the notion that
tongues other than English are alien in the United States is in-
creasingly difficult to support. Today nearly one-fifth of all
Americans speak a language other than English in their homes.
The presence of so many languages and modes of expression adds
a critical dimension to American society. Important choices must
be made about how we accommodate the language preferences of
the bilingual and immigrant citizens across the span of American
society: schooling, government services, and telecommunications,
to pick a few examples. This Article focuses on the challenges of
bilinguality in the workplace.
Influxes of immigrants have been constant throughout Ameri-
can history. The United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (successor to the Immigration and Naturalization Service)
counted 68,217,481 immigrants to the United States from 1820
through 2002.1 At first the majority of newcomers arrived from
Europe (38,816,282), 2 but recent statistics indicate that Latin
America and Asia are now the primary sources of immigrants.
From 1991 through 2000, for example, 4,486,806 immigrants from
Latin America3 and 2,795,672 from Asia 4 made up roughly 80% of
1. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, IMMIGRANTS 11 at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistcs/
IMM02yrbk/IMM2002.pdf) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
2. Id. at 14.
3. Id. The term "America," as used here, refers to the new world other than the
United States. Id. This figure includes 191,987 persons from Canada. Presumably most are




the total number of immigrants (9,095,417).' The current influx of
people from Latin America and Asia can be viewed as the con-
tinuation of a longstanding pattern of opening the country
periodically for the purpose of meeting labor demands. Each past
wave of immigration, except for arrivals from the British Isles or
Canada, brought millions of individuals who spoke an array of lan-
guages other than English . The current wave of immigrants is the
same except for one important aspect: prior groups were expected
to, and did, assimilate prevailing cultural norms, including the use
of English." It is now rare to hear anyone speaking Ukranian or
Polish in a Detroit factory or suburb, for example.
Our present attitude toward non-English languages, however, is
different. There is a tendency to view the old assimilationist man-
date as the tool of xenophobic nativists, which is certainly true in
part.9 We are also inclined to view language as an aspect of race or
ethnicity. Some, moreover, see attempts to discourage the use of
other languages as a violation of civil rights. The old consensus
that persons coming to this country should adopt English as a
badge of citizenship has fallen apart. More to the point of this Ar-
ticle, the weight of contemporary legal scholarship views attempts
by employers to control their employees' choice of language as
wrong.
The courts, in contrast, normally have sided with employers in
disputes over workplace language restrictions. Judicial dispositions
of workplace language claims have been naive at best, and perhaps
a bit disingenuous. The leading case is Garcia v. Spun Steak." Two
5. Id.
6. See Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Se-
curity Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REv. 975, 992 (2000) ("The United States, despite its heritage
as a 'nation of immigrants,' historically has alternated periods of xenophobia with periods
of relaxed immigration standards to meet industrial and agricultural labor needs."); see also
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIvISM 1860-1925 114
(2d ed. 1963) (noting opposition to immigration regulation by industrialists needing cheap
labor).
7. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: an Essay on American Languages, Cultural Plu-
ralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 274 (1992) (noting that post colonial
immigration to the United States has introduced peoples with different cultures and lan-
guages).
8. See, e.g.,JOHNJ. MILLER, THE UNMAKING OF AMERICANS: How MULTICULTURALISM
HAS UNDERMINED THE ASSIMILATION ETHIC 22-63 (1998) (discussing assimilative forces in
American history).
9. See, e.g., id. at 64-115 (discussing tension between assimilationist and multicultural
philosophies).
10. See, e.g., Juan E Perea, Killing Me Softly, With His Song: Anglocentrism and Celebrating
Nouveaux Latinas/os, 55 FLA. L. REv. 441 (2003). See generally infra Part IV.B-D (discussing
workplace language restrictions).
11. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
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bilingual" employees brought a Title VII challenge to their
employer's rule that English be used in all work related activity.
Neither side in Spun Steak could command the absolute sympathy
of a disinterested observer. Management imposed the rule after
receiving complaints that two workers were making derogatory,
racist comments in Spanish about an African- and a Chinese-
American coworker." It is difficult to fault an employer's concern
for promoting racial harmony on the shop floor. The rule was not
absolute: Workers were free to speak in Spanish during breaks,
. . ,,14
lunch, and on "[their] own time. The majority of workers were
faced with the burden of having to curtail speech in their native
language. Judge O'Scannlain's opinion readily concedes that
"primary language can be an important link to [one's] ethnic
culture and identity."15
While the result in Spun Steak was correct in my opinion, the
case was resolved in a facile manner. While the court agreed that
the facially neutral rule at issue was subject to disparate impact
analysis, it tempered its reasoning by insisting that the rule's effect
16
on the plaintiff must be significantly adverse . Post hoc ergo propter
hoc none of the plaintiff's arguments could ever meet this height-
ened standard. The employer's language restrictions could not
affect a right to cultural expression because workers had no rights
of self-expression in the workplace. The court also rejected a con-
clusion that English-only policies created a per se hostile work
environment under the Meritor Savings Bank rationale, finding
such a factual question inappropriate for summary judgment.' 9
Most interestingly, the court determined that the plaintiffs' bi-
linguality put them on par with native English speakers. The
plaintiffs had argued that the defendant's rule had affected them
by taking away a work privile e of speaking in a language in which
they were most comfortable. The court's response was two-fold. It
began by declaring that workplace privileges were within the discre-
tion of the employer. In this case, the Spun Steak Company was free
to limit the conversational privilege to English (and presumably
12. See id. at 1483 (the defendant's work force consisted of thirty-three employees, of
whom twenty-two were bilingual and two spoke only Spanish).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1487.
16. Id. at 1486.
17. Id.
18. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
19. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488-89.
20. Id, at 1487.
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Sanskrit) if it wished. The plaintiffs were left on par with the other
Anglophone employees. The court regarded language as a decision
within the control of a bilingual person. In terms reminiscent of a
priest proclaiming the primacy of free will, the court stated that
" [i] t is axiomatic that 'the language a person who is multi-lingual
elects to speak at a particular time is... a matter of choice.' ,,21 If a
bilingual worker can choose to speak in English, then he has not
been affected by the rule. The fact that bilinguals may have a ten-
dency to revert to their native tongues is an inconvenience, but
hardly the significant impact required by Title VII.
22
Spun Steak was a carefully crafted opinion. It was designed to
spare the federal courts the difficult task of evaluating the interests
of the parties by placing the presumably light burden of confor-
mity on bilingual employees. This approach subsequently has been
followed by nearly all federal circuits considering Title VII lan-
23guage discrimination claims. It is also a deeply unsatisfying
method for resolving such an important issue of workplace and
anti-discrimination policy. Even if we assume that bilinguals may
chose between languages at a given moment, the Spun Steak analy-
sis cuts off consideration of significant issues. The Spun Steak
mentality preempts discussion of what equal treatment in the
workplace means in the context of language. No one would say
that the ability to use a segregated restroom makes the effect of
such a practice insignificant. As a factual matter, the plaintiffs in
Spun Steak had a different experience from the strictly Anglophone
employees. Dismissing their suit because of an ability to speak Eng-
lish in the alternative derails a useful discussion of whether the
customary presumptions of civil rights laws apply to language
claims.
Measuring employees' equality interests in speaking their
preferred language in the workplace is a difficult proposition.
Differing views on the nature or strength of these interests, and the
competing interests of employers, will inevitably lead to good faith
disagreements. At the risk of seeming a throwback in an increasingly
diverse society, I conclude that evenly applied employer rules
mandating the use of English in the workplace may be a legitimate,
non-discriminatory strategy for managing a linguistically
complicated workforce. My argument rests on the ultimate
conclusions that individuals have the capacity to comply in most
21. Id. (quoting Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)).
22. Id. at 1488.
23. See infra Part IV.A (reviewing language discrimination claims brought under Title
VII).
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instances with such rules; that language restrictions serve neutral
and rational goals; and that such restrictions are far less likely to
serve as a cover for animus or bias than rules touching on race,
ethnicity, gender, or other immutable characteristics.
The plan of this Article is as follows. Part II surveys the language
competencies of Americans, relying primarily on results reported
in the 2000 Census. Although the Census elicits limited informa-
tion, it has the virtue of being recent and comprehensive. Results
indicate a high degree of English proficiency in the United States.
Although 17.9% of the population age five or older speak a lan-
guage other than English at home, nearly 96% of all persons older24
than four believe that they speak English with competency. Thus
the key issue in language policy is not providing for masses of per-
sons who can't speak English; rather, we must address the
problems of the bilinguals' desire to speak their native tongues.
Part III takes a critical look at the use of anti-discrimination
concepts underlying Title VII. That statute embodies the "civil
rights model," which regards characteristics such as race and gen-
der as improper bases for workplace decisionmaking. Our concept
of discrimination and its harms derives from constitutional equal
protection claims. Collectively these decisions portray distinctions
based on inalterable traits, such as race and gender, as causing
dignitary as well as economic injury. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has shown concern over the unfairness of relying on stereo-
types, and generally has viewed consideration of immutable
characteristics as pointless.' 5 In sum, decisions influenced by un-
changeable traits are suspicious and presumptively discriminatory;
persons who have been judged by such criteria, moreover, need
government protection. To enforce these constitutional precepts,
the Supreme Court has developed a system of institutional skepti-
cism (i.e., strict and heightened scrutiny) to be applied whenever
government actors use suspicious classifications."' I will then trace
these anti-discrimination principles into Title VII.
Part IV is the lynchpin of the Article. Here I ask whether the
civil rights model works with language discrimination claims. The
answer is no. Language is fundamentally different from race, eth-
nicity, gender, or even national origin. In Part IV(A), I address the
threshold question of whether the framers of Title VII intended to
24. See infra Part II (discussing English language competency of United States popula-
tion).
25. See generally infra Part III (discussing Supreme Court's development of the civil
rights model).
26. See generally infra Part III.A.3 (discussing strict and intermediate scrutiny).
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create language discrimination claims, and conclude that the rule
against "national origin" discrimination does not reach this far.
Part IV(B) considers whether language is a mutable characteristic.
I argue that language is an alterable trait. In most circumstances,
individuals have the capacity to learn and use a new language ef-
fectively. I also reject the argument that language and culture are
inextricably linked. Part IV(C) argues that workplace language
rules, even those that require the use of English at all times, can
serve a rational purpose and hence present little risk that suspi-
cious irrelevancies will creep into workplace decisionmaking. My
analysis concludes, in Part IV(D), that the characteristics of muta-
bility and relevance take language discrimination claims outside
the realm of Title VII's civil rights model. Bilingual employees are
not defenseless against stereotypes that arise from facts they cannot
alter; hence, the civil rights model's distrust of decisions based on
immutable traits does not come into play. Language rules likewise
lack the aura of irrelevance that makes racial or gender classifica-
tions suspect. Persons who speak a language other than English
may well suffer from racial or ethnic discrimination, but that is a
separate matter. Part V offers concluding remarks.
Before moving on, let me emphasize what this Article does not
do. I am concerned with the issue of language rights as an equality
interest. Equality is a matter of ensuring that everyone who is alike
receives equal treatment. Disagreements over the application of
this concept are inevitable, as demonstrated by the persistence of
Title VII and equal protection claims, but most would agree that
the proper result leaves comparable persons on an equal footing.
Support for minority language rights, however, is not limited to
equality models. Multiculturalism, for example, reflects a belief
that all cultures have something valuable to say about the human• 21
experience. Immigrants, according to this view, should receive
28
accommodations to ease the transition into their new society.
Contemporary American legal and other scholars would tend to fit
this concept under the rubric of promoting diversity in the work-
place. Whether the American workplace should be remade
through such devices as positive language rights is a complicated
and controversial matter that I will leave for another time and
place.
27. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS
OF RECOGNITION 66--68 (1994); Diane Ravitch, Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures, 59 AM.
SCHOLAR 337, 340-41 (1990).
28. WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR 29-31,162-72 (2001).
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II. THE NUMBERS: ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
How well the American population as a whole speaks English in-
fluences the development of laws and policies that govern
language in the workplace. At its simplest level, language policy
should address the issues of lowering barriers to economic oppor-
tunity for those who speak English less than fluently. American
government has done quite little to improve the lot of persons who
are not proficient in English. Our principal initiative has been to
devise bilingual public school programs that accommodate school-
age children whose primary language is one other than English.
Amending the Bilingual Education Act, the Education Amend-
ments of 1974 established a clear preference that bilingual
education be made available to school children with limited Eng-
lish proficiency.2 9 Bilingual education's benefits have been hotly5 0
disputed. Federal support for such practices, moreover, began to
recede in the 1980s and was significantly curtailed in the recent
29. SeeEducation Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 83-380, § 702,88 Stat. 484 (1974):
The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States, in order to establish
equal educational opportunity for all children ... to encourage the establishment
and operation, where appropriate, of educational programs using bilingual educa-
tional practices, techniques, and methods .... which are designed to meet the
educational needs of [limited English proficiency] children; and to demonstrate ef-
fective ways of providing, for children of limited English-speaking ability, instruction
designed to enable them, while using their native language, to achieve competence
in the English language.
Id.
30. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 8, at 174-208 (concluding that bilingual education has
been a failure); RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD
RODRIGUEZ 26-27 (1981) (drawing on personal experience to argue that bilingual educa-
tion simplistically falls to distinguish between public and private individualism); Walter
Huddleston, The Misdirected Policy of Bilingualism, in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK
ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 114, 115 (James Crawford ed., 1992) (arguing
that bilingualism has lost its role as a transitional strategy and has become a bicultural man-
date).
31. See, e.g., Rachel E Moran, Bilingual Education, Immigration, and the Culture of Disin-
vestment, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 163 (1999) (criticizing federal retreat from bilingual
education); Recent Legislation, Education-English Immersion-Colorado Voters Reject an Eng-
lish Immersion Ballot Initiative.-Amendment 31: English Language Education, in Legislative
Council of the Colorado General Assembly, 2002 Ballot Information Booklet 18-20, 69-74, 116
HARV. L. REV. 2709, 2711 (2003) (describing erosion of federal support for bilingual educa-
tion in the Eighties).
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No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Other than certain non-
discrimination regulations issued by the EEOC under Title VII,
33
practically nothing has been done to accommodate persons who
speak a language other than English in the workplace. Nor should
this be surprising: it is generally accepted that the ability to speak
English is a necessary job requirement for the majority of occupa-
tions in the United States.34
Once English proficiency-for whatever reason-reaches a level
where most workers speak the language well, different concerns
arise. Workers who can communicate effectively in English do not
need laws to protect them against non-existent language deficien-
cies. Instead, we begin to confront issues of bilingualism in the
workplace. Here the law must weigh management's interest in con-
trolling the work environment against the worker's desire to speak
in a preferred language. A decision to confer language-based
rights on workers who already speak proficient English must re-
flect a value judgment that choice of language has personal, social,
or cultural value that supersedes an opposing business interest.
This Article addresses the issue of whether the equality interest
underlying Title VII is sufficient to overcome an employer's cus-
tomary prerogative to set work rules. Although not the focus of this
paper, alternative theories, such as multiculturalism, may come
into play as justifications for creating or protecting bilingual envi-
ronments.
So, what is the state of English in America? It's thriving. Results
from the 2000 Decennial Census of Population and Housing tend to
establish that English proficiency is commonplace in Twenty-First
Century America. English has become, if one can tolerate the irony
of the phrase, the lingua franca of America. The Census Bureau's
long form questionnaire for 2000 included questions that permitted
the Bureau to determine the language proficiencies of the American
32. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). Title III of the Act lists among its pur-
poses a desire "to help ensure that children who are limited English proficient, including
immigrant children and youth, attain English pmficiency, develop high levels of academic
attainment in English, and meet the same challenging State academic content and student
academic achievement standards as all children are expected to meet." Id. at 1690 (empha-
sis added).
33. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing EEOC anti-discrimination guidelines for workplace
language restrictions).
34. See generally infra Part IV.C (discussing relevance of language to work).
35. See generally U.S. Census Bureau, Language Use and English Speaking Ability 2000:
Census 2000 Brief available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Census Brief] (de-
scribing questions relating to language on 2000 Census).
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population five years of age or older. 6 Composite statistics for the
United States reveal that 46,951,595 of 262,375,152 persons over the
age of four (17.9% of the population) speak at least one "Language
Other Than English" ("LOTE") at home. 7 The majority of this
group (28,101,052) speak Spanish, but many other languages are38
in use. 10,017,989 persons speak "Other Indo-European
languages," including French (1,633,838), German (1,383,442),
and Italian (1,000,370). 9 "Asian and Pacific Island languages"
account for 6,960,065 at-home speakers, among whom 2,022,143
speak Chinese, 1,224,241 the Philippine language of Tagalog, and
1,009,627 Vietnamese. A final category for "Other languages"
totals 1,872,489 and includes such tongues as Navajo (178,014),
Arabic (614,582), and Hebrew (195,374). 41 Thus, nearly one in five
Americans wakes to say "buenos dias," "bonjour," or a similar
phrase instead of "good morning."
There is significant variation in language usage by state. Some
jurisdictions are tight pockets of English monolingualism. In Mis-
sissippi, for example, a mere 3.6% of residents speak a LOTE at
42 43home. Alabama reports a 3.9% rate. Other states, in contrast,
are astonishingly multilingual. In California, 39.5% of the popula-
tion speaks a LOTE in the home. Other states with high rates of
non-English home usage are New Mexico (36.5%), Texas (31.2%),
New York (28.0%), Hawaii (26.6%), Arizona (25.9%), New Jersey
(25.5%), Nevada and Florida (each with 23.1%), and Rhode Island
(20.0%). 4' For the most part, these jurisdictions are home to Span-
ish speakers. California, for example, is home to 8,105,505 Spanish
speakers, representing 65.3% of the state's 12,401,765 persons who
36. See id.
37. U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tables on Lan-
guage Use and English Ability: 2000 (PHC-T-20), Table 1, Language Use, English Ability, and
Linguistic Isolation for the Population 5 Years and Over by State: 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t20/tabOl.pdf (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Table I
38. See id.
39. U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing Summary Tables on Lan-
guage Use and English Ability: 2000 (PHC-T-20), Table 5, "Detailed List of Languages Spoken at
Home for the Population 5 Years and Over by State: 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/
population/cen2000/phc-t20/tabO5.pdf (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of
Law Reform) [hereinafter Table 5].
40. Id.
41. Id.






speak a LOTE at home.46 Texas has 5,195,182 Spanish speakers, or
86.4% of 6,010,753 persons who speak a LOTE at home. 7 Given
these numbers, it is hardly surprising that the leading Title VII
language discrimination decisions originated in the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, which cover large parts of the traditionally Spanish
speaking Southwest.48
One might conclude from the variety of languages spoken that
America is in danger of becoming a Tower of Babel. Yet there is
little actual risk of America turning into a society that cannot
communicate with itself. English is our de facto common lan-
guage. Deficiency in English is the exception. The Census Bureau
reports that for residents age five or older in 2000, some
215,423,557 spoke only English in the home, and 25,631,188 per-
sons who spoke a LOTE at home claimed to speak English 'Very
well." 49 Together these groups represent nearly 91.9% of the perti-
nent population.50 If we add those persons who speak a LOTE in
the home but also speak English "Well" (10,33,556), 5 1 we account
for 95.8% of the population. A small core of citizens reported Eng-
lish language deficiencies, with 7,620,719 (2.9%) identifying
themselves as speaking English "Not well" and 3,366,132 (1.3%) as
"Not at all."5 2 Similarly, the Census reports that only 11,893,572
persons (4.5%) live in "Linguistically isolated" households. 53 The
latter are defined as homes where no one R erson fourteen years or
older speaks English at least "Very well."" One can easily sympa-
thize with the situation of persons who have not acquired a
functional level of English. Ironically, such persons are more likely
to find employment in undesirable positions and are less likely to
bring Title VII claims.55
Although the 2000 Census provides only a snapshot of language
proficiency in a single year, it does tend to bear out earlier studies
46. Table 5, supra note 39.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993); Gutierrez v. S.E.
Jud. Dist. County of L.A. Mun. Ct., 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot by 490 U.S.
1016 (1989);Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Garcia v. Cloor, 618
E2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).





54. Census Brief, supra note 35, at 10.
55. Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for
Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2182 (1994) (noting that immi-
grants with limited English skills are more likely than others to work in sweatshops and are
kept silent by their sense of vulnerability).
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indicating that English language acquisition is an inevitable aspect
of American residency. Traditionally, the immigrant's pathway to
mastering English has been a three-generation affair. The first
generation retains a foreign tongue as its primary language; the
second generation is bilingual; the third speaks English as its
56
native language. Studies of linguistic assimilation by Hispanic
immigrants show an even faster rate of mastering English. The
first, by McCarthy and Valdez in 1986, concluded that the three
generation paradigm applied to Mexican-Americans in
California.57 They observed that among the immigrant generation,
including those who had been in the United States for only a short
time, about one-quarter spoke English well. 58 By the second
generation, over 90% were proficient in English, and by the third,
around 95% had achieved proficiency. 59 Over half of the third
generation are monolingual English speakers. 6° A later study by
Veltman in 1988 focused on all Hispanics and suggested that
assimilation for this group was collapsing into a two-generation61
process. He also concluded that the English acquisition process
generally ends within fifteen years. The actual degree of
proficiency is determined primarily by the immigrant's length of
stay in the United States and his or her age at arrival, with the
result that those who come as older teenagers or adults will enjoy a
lesser degree of proficiency in English than their younger
62
companions. Veltman's conclusion can be read to support the
proposition that a cessation of Hispanic immigration would result
in the decline or disappearance of Spanish in the United States
within fifteen years.63
Census results confirm in a rough way the conclusions of the
McCarthy-Valdez and Veltman studies, that acquisition of English
proficiency is a transitional aspect of immigration. Data from 2000
indicate that for the population age five or older, birth outside of
the United States is a significant factor in English language profi-
56. Carol Schmid, Language Rights and the Legal Status of English-Only Laws in the Public
and Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 65, 71 (1992) (citing KEVIN F. McCARTHY & R.
BURCIAGA VALDEZ, CURRENT AND FUTURE EFFECTS OF MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN CALIFOR-
NIA 65 (1986)).
57. Id. at 61-65.
58. Id. at 61.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. CALVIN VELTMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE SPANISH LANGUAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
3, 66 (1988).
62. Id. at 40.
63. Id. at 3, 44-45, 66-67.
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ciency. Of the 46,951,595 who speak a LOTE in the home, over
64
half (25,497,023 or 54.2%) are foreign born. Significantly, of the
21,320,407 persons who speak English less than "Very well," nearly
three-quarters (15,672,816 or 73.5%) were foreign born." Precise
comparisons of 2000 Census data and the McCarthy-Valdez and
Veltman studies are impossible. The Census's definition of a LOTE
unfortunately does not distinguish a person's primary or dominant
language. Census workers were instructed to have respondents
identify themselves as speakers of a LOTE in the home whether
66
they spoke that language either sometimes or always. Also, classi-
fication of ability to speak English "Very well," "Well," "Not well,"
and "Not at all" in the Census depended on the respondent's self
perceptions. 67 Nevertheless, the foreign born persons account for
such a high percentage of persons who speak English less than
very well-73.5%-that is difficult to dismiss the positive connec-
tion between native birth and facility in English. Moreover, the
range of English proficiency within the rather broad category of
speaking "Less than very well" is consistent with conclusions that
immigrants themselves tend to achieve varying measures of English
competency within fifteen years of arrival.
Ultimately, English wins out over its competitors in American
society. The reasons are obvious: American government, business,
and culture are conducted in English. Twenty-seven states have
adopted some form of "English-only" laws.6 Although the official
English movement reflects, in my opinion, a questionable combi-
nation of xenophobia and sincere concern for the integrity of
American society, the channeling effect of such laws on public life
is unavoidable. Without a knowledge of English, how can one un-
derstand the law or public events, much less participate in them?
The need for English to ensure career advancement creates an ir-
resistible incentive to master the language, if not to prefer it. The
more ambitious will also know that English has become the de
64. U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tables on Lan-
guage Use and English Ability: 2000 (PHC-T20), Table 6, Language Spoken at Home and Ability to
Speak English by Nativity for the Population 5 Years and Over by State: 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t20/tabO6.pdf (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Table 6].
65. Id.
66. U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Summary File 3, Techni-
cal Documentation, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2OOO/doc/sf3.pdf (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
67. Id.
68. U.S. English, Inc., Towards a United America, Official English: States with Official Eng-
lish Laws, at http://www.us-english.org/inc/official/states.asp (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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facto international language of trade and commerce. There is also
the pervasive mass media, from billboards to television to the web.
We are enveloped by a continuous stream of commercially gener-
ated or sponsored information and images. Those messages are, for
the most part, in English. There is a touching passage in Sandra
Cisneros' The House on Mango Street where a mother, who has
attempted to maintain Spanish in the home, dissolves into tears
when she hears her son, who is just learning to speak, sing a Pepsi
jingle that he has heard on television.6 9 Transition is difficult, but
also enabling.
III. TITLE VII AND THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION MODEL
Nearly all federal claims attacking workplace language restric-
tions are brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Section 703(a) (1) of the Act deems it unlawful for an employer "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.,70 In
the following section, the Act prohibits efforts "to limit, segregate,
or classify" employees, with resulting loss of job opportunities, on
account of the same forbidden criteria. Conspicuously missing is
any reference in the text of the statute to language or a definition
72
of "national origin." The legislative history is equally silent.
Plaintiffs have proceeded on the theory that language is an as-
pect of national origin. One can hardly blame plaintiffs' attorneys
for exploiting a readily available cause of action in the absence of
specific legislation dealing with workplace language restrictions.
However one feels about the wisdom of language discrimination
claims, Title VII is an awkward device for judging them. Title VII is
based on an anti-discrimination model that promotes equality in-
terests by targeting employment practices that are likely to be
69. SANDRA CISNEROS, THE HOUSE ON MANGO STREET 74-75 (1984).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001) (emphasis added).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (2001).
72. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (finding legislative his-
tory of "national origin" discrimination is slight). See generally Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and
Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin"Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv.
805, 817-21 (1994) (reviewing legislative history and concluding that Congress understood
national origin in Title VII to mean the nation of one's birth or ancestry); infra Part III.B2.
(discussing legislative history of national origin provision).
[VOL. 38:1
Bilingualism and Equality
prejudicial. Likely prejudicial practices include those that relate to
immutable characteristics such as race, or those that involve stereo-
types. Language, in contrast, is not an immutable trait, is normally
relevant to job performance, and is less likely to invoke stereo-
typed thinking by employers. In short, it does not resemble other
equality interests that the anti-discrimination model attempts to
protect.
In this Part of the Article, I will discuss the goals and the me-
chanics of the "civil rights model" on which Title VII is based. I
defer until Part IV of my argument the idea that language claims
do not fit the anti-discrimination precepts of Title VII. Part III(A)
lays out the assumptions and goals of the antidiscrimination model
as first developed in the context of constitutional equal protection
claims. Next, in Subpart B(1), I track these principles into Title
VII. Finally, in Subpart B (2), I examine how the judicially elabo-
rated "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" methods of
proof reflect the assumptions of the civil rights model.
A. The Antidiscrimination Model in General
Prior to the passage of Title VII, employment was viewed largely
as a private, contractual matter that gave employers wide discretion
in making personnel decisions, including the power to make irra-
tional or prejudicial employment decisions. The Act represented
a finding by Congress that employer discretion needed to be cur-
tailed in order to rectify the inferior social and economic status of
African-American citizens.74 In the process, Congress also included
protections based on religion, sex, and national origin. Title VII's
prohibition of racial and other discrimination embodies the "anti-
discrimination" or "civil rights" model.7 The essence of this
approach is the belief that ensuring equality requires a large scale
response to the unjustified attitudes held by large portions of society
73. See Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protec-
tionsfora Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1497, 1515-16 (2002).
74. Id.
75. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimina-
tion Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1 (1976) (noting Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and Fair Housing Act of 1968 were based on antidiscrimination model); Cyn-
thia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 Thx. L. REv. 1655, 1659
(1996) (stating Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and
the employment provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act were "based on the anti-
discrimination model pioneered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964").
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towards certain of its other members. 6 The antidiscrimination
model rests on three intermediate conclusions that set the scope
and contours of the law's reaction to bias. First, that the purposeful
consideration of race and other immutable characteristics is unfair
since it subjects individuals to group judgments that they cannot
escape, individual merit notwithstanding. The resulting injuries,
moreover, work dignitary as well as economic harms. Second, the
concept of bias cannot be limited to instances of animus or hostil-
ity, but also includes superficially benign manifestations, such as
stereotyped thinking. Finally, consideration of immutable charac-
teristics is in most cases irrelevant to valid decisionmaking. Since
these concepts were initially and remain most fully developed in
constitutional law, let us begin the discussion there.
1. Constitutional Antidiscrimination Principles-At its simplest, the
constitutional requirement of equal protection is a command to
government actors that people who are alike should be treated
• 77
alike. It reflects a conclusion that group judgments fail to appre-
ciate infinite individual variations. Equality of treatment,
however, is an abstract principle that is difficult to apply in a com-
plex social context. Who can say with metaphysical certainty that a
group of citizens who were denied government benefits are truly
different from the group who received them? We eliminate these
conceptual traps by deferring to government classifications in so-
cial and economic matters, employing the well known "rational
basis" test to vindicate government choices in nearly all instances.79
Distinctions based on race, gender, and other immutable traits are,
however, treated differently.
76. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000) (proposing that civil rights model was grounded
on the premise that minorities, including persons with disabilities, are denied opportunities
because of irrational stereotypes and archaic social structures).
77. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State
shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." (citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982))); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (arguing
that equal protection "emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of indi-
viduals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.").
78. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (striking down an Alabama statute
permitting alimony only for women because it wrongly characterized all women as depend-
ent in family relationships). See generally infra Part II1A2.b (discussing constitutional
restraints on stereotyping).
79. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 (arguing social and economic legislation is
presumed to be valid if rationally related to legitimate state interest); see alsoJOHN E. NOWAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 at 687 (7th ed. 2004) (rational basis
test is used for general economic legislation).
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Equal protection principles recognize that certain classes of per-
sons are likely to be subjected to improper discrimination and
therefore require enhanced protection from government action.
In Carolene Products (an otherwise unappetizing decision about the
shipment of milk mixed with vegetable oil in interstate com-
merce), the Supreme Court in a footnote left open the possibility
that the usual presumption that legislation is proper should bend
when laws touch "discrete and insular minorities." 80 Justice Stone
suggested that a "more searching judicial inquiry" might be ap-
propriate because prejudice against minorities impedes the
normal political processes that ordinarily provide protection to
citizens. As elaborated by later decisions, the Court refers to a set
of factors, sometimes called the "Carolene factors," when deciding
whether a particular classification should receive enhanced judicial
82
review: (1) a histo7 of discrimination; (2) immutability of defin-
ing characteristics; and, (3) political powerlessness.84 Thus far,
race, national origin, gender, alienage, and illegitimacy have quali-
fied for some level of enhanced scrutiny. 5
An important qualification of equal protection is its focus on the
attitudes and motivations of government actors. The Court has
consistently required plaintiffs to establish a discriminatory
purpose in order to prevail on an equal protection claim. The
leading case is Washington v. Davis. 86 At issue was an examination,
given to police force applicants by the District of Columbia, which
blacks failed at a higher rate that whites. Justice White's opinion
refused to find that a facially neutral policy with discriminatory
impact violated equal protection rules. He insisted on a showing of
87
some discriminatory purpose. Although the requirement of a
80. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) ("[C]ertain groups, indeed
largely the same groups, have historically been 'relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process."') (citations omitted); see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978) (opinion of Powell,J.); Mass. Bd. of Ret.
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1,28 (1973).
83. See, e.g., Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.14; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
84. See, e.g., Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.14; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313;
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
85. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.3.2
(race and national origin), § 9.4.1 (gender), § 9.5.2 (alienage), § 9.6 (non-marital children)
(2nd ed. 2002).
86. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
87. Id. at 239.
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88
discriminatory purpose is the subject of much academic criticism,
the Court has continued to demand proof of such intent.89
The Court's insistence on locating equal protection violations in
the attitudes of government officials has not, however, reduced the
requirement of intent to a simplistic concept. Rather, the Court's
decisions have recognized that prejudice is a subtle phenomenon
that reveals itself in many ways. An extended discussion of the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence is well beyond the scope of
this Article. For present purposes, it is sufficient to focus on two
aspects of the Court's constitutional thinking in this area. The first
is the Court's broad conception of discrimination, which views bias
as both a dignitary and an economic harm, defines bias broadly to
include its more benign manifestation in stereotyping, and regards
immutable traits as largely irrelevant to valid government deci-
sions. Second, there is the system of scrutiny by which we judge
equal protection claims. The Court's decisions reflect a deep sus-
picion of attempts by government actors to employ classifications
based on immutable characteristics. I will argue later in Subpart
B (1) that these two assumptions of equal protection jurisprudence
also underlie Title VII.
2. The Nature and Harms of Prejudice in the Constitutional Context
a. "Prejudices, Biases, Antipathies, and the Like:" 90 Bias as a Digni-
tary Harm-Bias poisons a society and is perhaps the ultimate
embodiment of the malum in se. The effects of prejudice are read-
ily apparent. Minorities and other targeted groups are denied
equal opportunities to compete for the economic, social, and po-
litical benefits that society affords to others. There is, however, a
more subtle and equally harmful effect: antipathies tend to dimin-
ish the humanity of groups of persons by communicating a
message of "differential worth." ' On several occasions the Court
has voiced concern that classification by immutable trait conveys a
88. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 85, § 9.3.3.2 at 684-85.
89. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (finding statistics indicating
that prosecutors seek death penalty more often for black defendants is not evidence of
discriminatory intent, which must be established in individual cases); City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (finding there was insufficient evidence that at-large election
of city council members resulting in election of few blacks reflected discriminatory pur-
pose); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979) (finding discriminatory
impact by gender was not proof of discriminatory purpose).
90. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND) THE MODERN MIND 147 (1930) (arguing that judges
should receive training in psychology to understand better the effect of the judges own
thought processes on the decision).
91. See Brest, supra note 75, at 7; Kim, supra note 73, at 1516.
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message of inferiority to a disfavored group and subjects individu-
als to undeserved and sometimes painful stigma.
In West Virginia v. Strauder, the Court set aside a state law that
excluded blacks from juries. 92 Although the Court based its deci-
sion in part on the defendant's right to have a jury drawn from a
cross-section of the community, it also emphasized the Fourteenth
Amendment's purpose of protecting black citizens "from legal dis-
criminations, implying [their] inferiority in civil society. 93 Justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessy turns on the same argument. Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren's opinion in Brown v. Board oEducation provides
the most eloquent statement of this principle. He said: "To sepa-
rate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."96 By the 1985 decision
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the Court could say
without a second thought that classification by race, alienage or
national origin conveys a view that "those in the burdened class are
not as worthy or deserving as others. "9'
b. Stereotyping by Immutable Traits-Applying enhanced scrutiny
to official actions relying on immutable characteristics also en-
compasses a constitutional policy against stereotyping. While
stereotyping may be more benign than outright hatred, the harm
is still significant. It is unfair to impose judgments about a group
upon an individual when that person is precluded from escaping a
group judgment due to the immutability of the defining character-
istic. While the concern is general to the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence, it comes out distinctly in the redistricting and per-
emptory challenge cases, and above all in the Court's gender
discrimination opinions.
92. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
93. Id. at 303. See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 499 (1972) (proposing exclusion of
blacks fromjury creates stigma).
94. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("What can
more certainly arouse race hate, what can more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of
distrust between these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground
that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in pub-
lic coaches occupied by white citizens?").
95. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
96. Id.
97. 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
98. See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) ("Classifica-
tions based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for
remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility.").
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Beginning in the early Nineties, the Court decided a series of
cases that attempted to determine when and how to apply strict
scrutiny to racially inspired election districts. While these cases as
a group are remarkably unenlightening, one can fairly summarize
them as follows. Strict scrutiny is required whenever race is used to
draw election districts,00 but only when race is the predominant
factor.'0 ' For those districting decisions that are the fruit of purely
racially conscious action, however, the Court has voiced concern
that such configurations are based on stereotypes about voting be-
havior. In Shaw v. Reno, Justice O'Connor responded to Justice
Souter's argument that racial gerrymandering was harmless unless
it diluted voting strength by arguing that such practices reinforced
racial stereotypes and signaled to elected representatives that the
represented racial groups rather than their whole constituency.
Similarly, in Miller v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy noted that racially
conscious districting presumes that members of the targeted group
"think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidate at the polls, thus committing the very racial
stereotyping that equal protection forbids. Even though the chal-
lenged districts in Shaw v. Reno and Miller might be taken to
advantage minority voters generally, in the Court's mind the unde-
sirable cost of such aggregate benefits is to reduce individual
members of such groups to xerox copies.
Rejection of stereotyping is also an important element of the
Court's peremptory challenge cases. The Court has forbidden the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in juror selection,
holding that the exclusion of members of racial groups must be
justified by a racially neutral explanation. The classic situation, Bat-
son, involves prosecutorial exclusion of members from the
defendant's racial group,0 4 although the Court has extended the
prohibition to civil cases '°5 and to challenges by criminal defen-P 106 .. . .
dants. Significantly, the Court views discriminatory strikes as a
99. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996);
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993).
100. SeeCHEMERINSKY, supra note 85, § 9.3.5.3 at 717-20.
101. Id.; Miller, 515 U.S. at 920; see also Bush, 517 U.S. at 958-59 (proposing that strict
scrutiny applies when all other legitimate districting principles are subordinated to race)
(citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 916);cf Easley, 532 U.S. at 241-43 (holding that the use of race is
permissible for political reasons, e.g., to create a safe Democratic district).
102. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650.
103. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647).
104. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
105. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
106. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
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violation of the prospective juror's right, such that discrimination
may occur even though excluded jurors and defendants are of dif-107
ferent races. Racially motivated peremptory challenges presume
that the excluded potential jurors cannot assess a case fairly or dis-.108
passionately. The Court has been unwilling to accept this
assumption. Justice Kennedy says in Edmondson that "if race stereo-
types are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price
is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution." 09 Even Jus-
tice Scalia, whose opinion in Holland v. Illinois refused to hold that
the Sixth Amendment's requirement that a jury be composed of a
fair cross-section of the community forbids peremptory challenges,
states in dicta that a prosecutor's assumption that a black juror
cannot be impartial violates the Equal Protection Clause. 10
Stereotyping is the primary concern in constitutional gender
discrimination claims. In one line of cases, the Court has set aside
state laws that presume that women are economically dependant
on their husbands. In Orr v. Orr, for example, the Court struck
down an Alabama law that permitted women, but not men, to re-
ceive alimony.'11 The Court remarked that the Alabama scheme
impermissibly assigned women to a "dependent role "112 in family
relationships. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld disallowed a rule under the
Social Security Act that permitted widowed mothers, but not fa-
thers, to receive social security based on the income of the
deceased spouse,' observing that the rule was based on the stereo-
type that a husband's income alone was vital to family support.14
In another set of gender cases, the Court rejected as a mis-
guided stereotype the notion that women are destined for
particular vocations. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
107. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1991).
108. Cf Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion) (quoting Bat-
son, 476 U.S. at 89). In Hernandez, a plurality of the Court sustained a prosecutor's challenge
of Spanish-speaking members of the venire on grounds that might rely on direct witness
testimony rather than a translation supplied by a court supplied interpreter. The prosecutor
argued that the exclusions were based on individualized assessments of credibility, which
the Court accepted as a sufficiently race-neutral explanation. Id. at 359-63.
109. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630.
110. 493 U.S. 474, 484 n.2 (1990).
111. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
112. Id. at 278.
113. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
114. Id. at 643; see also Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (disal-
lowing state program that automatically awarded benefits to widows but forced widowers to
demonstrate need or physical incapacitation); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
(striking down section of Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits pro-
gram automatically permitting women benefits based on husband's income, but requiring
the latter to demonstrate that wife had contributed over half of support).
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the Court overturned a state nursing school's policy of admitting
only women.'1 5 Justice O'Connor was unimpressed with the State's
argument that the restrictive admissions policy was intended to
remedy past discrimination against women, and saw the rule as
perpetuating a stereotype that nursing was woman's work. 6justice
Ginsburg's opinion in United States v. Virginia found that the Vir-
ginia Military Academy's exclusion of women was based on
unjustified stereotypes about the "different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females."" 7 The recent decision in Hibbs
v. Nevada Department of Human Resources, in which the Court re-
jected a sovereign immunity challenge to the Family and Medical
Leave Act, also turns on the rejection of stereotyping. ChiefJustice
Rehnquist's opinion sustains the gender-neutral leave provisions of
the FMLA as valid section 5 legislation since they target the uncon-
stitutional stereotype that women are the primary care givers in the
family.
19
c. Irrelevance of Immutable Characteristics-Last, the equal protec-
tion cases presume that consideration of immutable characteristics
is rarely relevant to proper decisionmaking. The assumption that
race-conscious decisions turn on irrelevant considerations is long-
standing. It is implicit in the elder Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy,
where he argued that race is constitutionally irrelevant to the en-
joyment of civil rights.2 More recently in Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., Justice White stated assuredly that "when a stat-
ute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin [such] factors are
so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state in-
terest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy . . . ,,12' Last term Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger maintained the firm pre-
sumption that racial classifications rest on irrelevancies and are
acceptable only upon proof of a compelling state interest."' The
115. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
116. Id. at 729-30.
117. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); cf Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding
program of male-only draft registration and deferring to legislative and executive authority
in military affairs).
118. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
119. Id. at 1979.
120. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554-55 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
121. 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
122. 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003);
Because the Fourteenth Amendment "protect[s] persons, not groups," all "governmen-
tal action based on race-a group classification long recognized as in most
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited--should be subjected to detailed
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view that race is presumptively immaterial to state action has be-
come hornbook law.
23
Regarding race as irrelevant in most cases reflects common
sense. Why should there be racial distinctions, for example, in
government benefit programs? Why should concepts of due proc-
ess vary with the ethnicity of a defendant? There is no reason other
than a desire to recognize racial differences. Returning to Justice
White's comments in Cleburne, a racial category is most likely a
mask for bias. The scant likelihood that racially motivated actions
are truly relevant justifies strict scrutiny for racial categories. Occa-
sionally racially conscious state actions will meet this test. The
University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy was judged
to meet the compelling interest of achieving a diverse student
body. 24 In most cases, though, the government rule will fail .
In matters of gender, we also remain skeptical of the utility of
classification. The Cleburne Court's discussion of intermediate scru-
tiny included a comment that gender "generally provides no
sensible ground for differential treatment." 26 Justice Ginsburg's
remarks in United States v. Virginia acknowledged that gender classi-
fications do not equate with racial categories for all purposes,121
and that there are certain enduring variations between the sexes,
e.g., physical differences. 2 Nonetheless, the VMI decision's insis-
tence that purported gender differences be screened for "artificial
constraints, ""9 and that defendants offer an "exceedingly persua-
sive" justification130 for their actions make it unlikely that gender
classifications will survive.
judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has
not been infringed."
Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
123. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 85, § 9.1 at 646 (2002).
124. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331-35 (2003).
125. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding minority business
participation provisions of federal contract fail strict scrutiny), overruled ly Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (holding minority business enterprise program lacked remedial purpose and thus
failed strict scrutiny).
126. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 ("[Wlhat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect
statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect crite-
ria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society.") (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plural-
ity opinion)).
127. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
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3. The Constitutional Response: Skepticism-In response to the
equal protection mandate of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amend-
ments, the Court has fashioned a system of scrutiny by which
allegations of discrimination against state actors are evaluated. The
mechanics of the system are familiar and require only brief de-
scription. Classifications touching on purely social or economic
matters get minimal scrutiny, a.k.a. rational basis review, under
which the rule in question is presumed proper and the plaintiff
must show that it advances no proper state interest.' The applica-
tion of minimal scrutiny usually means that a claim is a loser,
although there have been exceptions. 12 If government action in-
volves a classification by race, ethnicity, gender, or another
immutable trait, however, a presumption of irregularity sets in.
Greatest skepticism is reserved for the so called "suspect" classi-133 134
fications including race and alienage. Any other attitude would
be strikingly naive, given the history of systematic racial discrimina-
tion including chattel slavery, Jim Crow laws, de jure segregation
and so forth. The defendant has the burden to show a compel-
ling state interest for the classification and demonstrate that the
scheme is narrowly tailored to meet such a goal. 136 There is a sec-
ond level of "intermediate" or "heightened" scrutiny that the
Court applies to classifications based on gender'
37 or illegitimacy. 138
131. See, e.g., Fed. Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc. 508 U.S.
307, 315 (1993) (stating plaintiffs must negate all conceivable justifications for legislative
classification).
132. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a state constitutional
provision forbidding pro-gay statutory actions under rational basis review); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (voiding a zoning ordinance under ra-
tional basis review).
133. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted
that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are imme-
diately suspect."); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (applying strict
scrutiny to a minority enterprises program under federal contract); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny to use of racial factors in a child custody determina-
tion).
134. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding state law improper
for forbidding welfare payments to aliens); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948) (finding a state law unconstitutional for denying commercial fishing licenses to
aliens).
135. See, e.g., Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432 ("Classifying persons according to their race is
more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns.").
136. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 (requiring the State to demonstrate that a classifica-
tion is "precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest").
137. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (applying heightened scru-
tiny to an all-male admission policy at a state-run military academy).
138. See, e.g., Clark v.Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny to strike
down a law requiring illegitimate children to establish paternity within six years).
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Here Government actors must identify a substantial or important
state interest to which the distinction is substantially related.'" The
less demanding test of intermediate scrutiny concedes a greater
likelihood that such classification may be proper. Either level of
enhanced scrutiny involves strong reservations about the motiva-
tions underlying state action, which are decidedly absent when
courts judge social or economic legislation under the deferential
rational basis standard.
Mistrust of the motives underlying suspect classifications is ex-
plicitly acknowledged in the Court's opinions.140 In Adarand, for
example, Justice O'Connor explains that the Court's strict scrutiny
cases reflect an abiding skepticism about racial classifications that
demands an exacting examination of their underlying purpose.141
She sets out her views at greater length in Croson, stating:
[T] he purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a
goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.141
Strict scrutiny is thus the Court's way of "operationalizing" skep-
ticism about racial and other classifications based on immutable
traits.143 At times the use of strict scrutiny may seem excessive.
There are arguments that racially sensitive programs, such as pub-
lic construction contract set asides, that were adopted for
seemingly innocent or remedial reasons should be judged under a
139. See, e.g., Hibbs v. Nevada Dep't. of Human Res., 123 S. Ct. 1972,1978 (2003); Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
140. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324-27 ("[A]ll racial classifications imposed by gov-
ernment must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.") (internal quotes
omitted).
141. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223; see also, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
285 (1986) (plurality opinion, Powell,J.) ("Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria
must necessarily receive a most searching examination."); Fullilove v. Kluznick, 448 U.S.
448, 491 (1980) (Burger, C.J.); id. at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[O]fficial action ...
treat[ing] a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect
and presumptively invalid.").
142. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
143. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1195, 1230 (2002).
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less strenuous standard.4 4 The court's decision in Metro Broadcast-
ing attempted to customize scrutiny to take account of such benign
government actions by applying intermediate scrutiny to an FCC
program for minority ownership of broadcast licenses. ' When
Metro Broadcasting was overruled in Adarand, the Supreme Court
expressed concerns that "despite the surface appeal of holding be-
nign racial classifications to a lower standard.., it may not always
be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign."'4 The
Court's skepticism about suspect classifications remains so great
that the recent decision in Grutter, in which the University of
Michigan Law School's affirmative action plan survived strict scru-
tiny, was based on the compelling state interest in creating a
diverse student body, not in integration per se.
147
B. The Antidiscrimination Model and Title VII
Title VII was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
first significant civil rights legislation of the Twentieth Century. It
was an ambitious and broadly fashioned attempt to extend to
American society generally the non-discrimination precepts that
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments could impose only on gov-
ernment entities.48  Title II of the Act sought to eliminate
discrimination in public accommodations, while Title VI focused
on federally funded activities. The employment provisions of Title
VII were inspired by the poor economic status of black citizens in
' 49
American society during the Sixties. Proponents of the Act re-
peatedly emphasized during the legislative process and floor
debates the economic disparities that discrimination had imposed
144. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 143. at 1237 ("That a law embodies a racial prefer-
ence is not significant in itself, but only for what it suggests about the underlying purpose,
conception, or effects of the law.").
145. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 563-66, overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
146. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29.
148. See, e.g., George Rutherglen & Daniel R. Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitu-
tion and Title VII: From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REv. 467, 470 (1988) (arguing
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 intended to extend constitutional prohibitions against pub-
lic discrimination to private actors).
149. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (asserting Con-





on African-Americans. Title VII, however, is concerned with far
more than achieving economic parity between the races. On key
points, the employment provisions of the Act reflect the expansive
view of discrimination developed in the equal protection context,
as well as its reliance on skepticism as the principal tool for ferret-
ing out bias.
1. Title VI's Concept of Bias-Human dignity was a primary con-
cern for the framers of Title VII. The Act's vaguely worded
prohibition of discrimination "against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin"' 5' gives no hint to the Twenty-First Century reader
of the racial crisis of the early Sixties. During the 1950s, the politi-
cally insulated federal courts had taken the lead in the fight against
racism in school desegregation cases, beginning with the landmark. 152
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, while the elected
branches shied away from the controversy. During the Eisenhower
administration, Congress passed two tentative civil rights acts in
1957153 and 1960.154 In the meantime, the American South became
a principal proving ground where black citizens, weary of unful-
filled promises of reform, began a campaign of non-violent
protests such as the lunch counter sit-ins in Greensboro, North
Carolina, 5 and the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama.15 The
150. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 7204 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark) ("I suggest that
economics is at the heart of racial bias. The Negro has been condemned to poverty because
of lack of equal job opportunities. This poverty has kept the Negro out of the mainstream of
American life."); 110 CONG. REc. 6547 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) ("At the pre-
sent time Negroes and members of other minority groups do not have an equal chance to
be hired, to be promoted, and to be given the most desirable assignments.").
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001) (emphasis added).
152. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
153. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957). The 1957 Act cre-
ated the Civil Rights Commission, authorized the Department of Justice to seek remedies
against discrimination in voting rights, made the provision for trial by jury in criminal con-
tempt cases, and set qualifications for federal jurors. See id.
154. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960). The 1960 Act con-
cerned, in pertinent part, obstruction of court orders, flight to avoid prosecution for
damaging public buildings, federal election records and the scope of the Civil Rights
Commissions powers. See id.
155. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH
CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1980) (recording history of sit-ins at
Woolworth's lunch counter);JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY
O NEGRO AMERICANS 623 (3d ed. 1967) (describing sit-ins); HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS
RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH REMEMBERED 80-81 (1977) (describing sit-
ins); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63, at 271-
73 (1988) (describing sit-ins).
156. See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 155, at 143-205 (discussing Montgomery bus boy-
cott); Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery
Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989) (same).
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situation came to a head in Birmingham when the infamous Bull
Connor loosed his dogs on a protest march by children on May 2,
1571963. President Kennedy, against his better political judgment,
decided that principle had to prevail over his pessimistic assess-
ment of the chances of getting a bill through Congress. He sent
the Civil Rights Act to Congress on June 19 of the same year.151
Title VII was only one part of the Civil Rights Act's broad civil
rights initiative. The public accommodations provisions in Title II
were more controversial and may well have been more important
• . . 159
to proponents of civil rights, judging from the fact that resistance
in the South had targeted public accommodations such as the
buses in Montgomery and lunch counters everywhere. The most
controversial aspect of Title VII for the Eighty-Eighth Congress
seems to have been whether to enforce the non-discrimination
mandate administratively via cease and desist orders or by means
of private causes of action brought in the courts. 160 Ultimately
Congress compromised,' 61 opting for enforcement through the
courts but endowing a new agency, the EEOC, with enforcement
powers. There was also some sentiment that Title VII might exceed
Congress's constitutional powers.162
Contemporary events as well as the legislative history make clear
that the Framers of the Civil Rights Act were reacting to overt, in-
157. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 16 (1985) (quoting John Kennedy saying to his
brother-and Attorney General-Robert: "If we're going to go down, let's go down on a
matter of principle").
158. President Kennedy's message read in part:
Events of recent weeks have again underlined how deeply our Negro citizens resent
the injustice of being arbitrarily denied equal access to those facilities and
accommodations which are otherwise open to the general public.... Surely, in 1963,
100 years after emancipation, it should not be necessary for any American citizen to
demonstrate in the streets for the opportunity to stop at a hotel, or to eat at a lunch
counter in the very department store in which he is shopping ....
Reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2363.
159. Id. at 18 (quoting then-Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield).
160. See, e.g., id. at 22, 35 (describing early proposals with strong administrative en-
forcement powers).
161. Compare H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 92 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2409 (additional majority views of Rep. Kastenmeier) (expressing preference for adminis-
trative enforcement) with id. at 2426-27 (additional views of Rep. Meader) (arguing that
House Judiciary Committee had not adequately considered effects of Title VII on manage-
ment and labor); see also id at 2477-78 (minority views of Rep. Poff and Rep. Cramer)
(questioning powers of EEOC under Title VII).
162. See id. at 2475-77 (minority views of Rep. Poff and Rep. Cramer) (questioning
constitutionality Title VII under Commerce and Privileges and Immunities Clauses).
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vidious, and often violent displays of racial animus that were so-
cially acceptable in many places.163 Of course statutory guarantees
of equal treatment in employment promote economic interests.
Title VII envisions a labor market where participants can find de-
sirable employment according to merit, regardless of race, gender,
or other irrelevant characteristics. Much of the legislative debate
involved a prolonged discussion of the economic loss black citizens
suffered as a result of discrimination. 164 But there is also an obvious
equality interest in preserving the dignity of individuals over the
demeaning message of inferiority stemming from racial disqualifi-
cations in employment. In this sense, Title VII also seeks to prevent
the same dignitary harms that the Court perceived in decisions
such as Strauder or Brown v. Board of Education.
16
5
Fortunately, overt discrimination is less common in Twenty-First
__166
Century America than it was when Title VII was enacted. A com-
bination of progressive leadership, educational efforts, increasing
business sophistication and expanding markets has led to the vir-
tual elimination of open racial qualifications for employment, and
most-though not all-gender based distinctions. Consequently
much of the damage done to human dignity by explicit group-
based disqualifications has disappeared. Workplace harassment
claims are the exception. Title VII's ethic of non-discrimination
has not filtered down evenly to the shop floor or to the office. In
the typical case, and usually against the employer's stated policies,
supervisors or coworkers engage in a pattern of abusive behavior
because of the employee's race or gender.
Justice Rehnquist's seminal opinion recognizing hostile environ-
ment claims in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson construed Title
VII to protect employees from abusive working conditions even in
the absence of pecuniary injury. In response to the bank's argument
that Title VII protects only against "tangible loss of an economic
character, not purely psychological aspects of the workplace envi-
ronment,"'6 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the language of Title
VII could not be confined to economic injuries, and that the
163. See Ann C. McGinley, Viva La Evoluci6n: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9
CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 418 n.7 (2000).
164. See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 202-04 (discussing legislative history of Title VII and
concluding that Congress viewed the "crux of the problem" to be opening employment
opportunities for black citizens).
165. See supra Part III.A.2.a (discussing constitutional treatment of bias as a dignitary in-
jury).
166. See McGinley, supra note 163, at 418.
167. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
168. Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id.
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EEOC's guidelines deeming sexual harassment to be discrimina-
tory even without an economic quid pro quo were controlling.170 By
characterizing the issue as "the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,"
1 71
Rehnquist located the harm in hostile environment claims strictly
within the realm of dignitary interests. The Meritor decision thus
parallels the concerns voiced in the Court's constitutional equal
protection decisions over government actions that communicate a
message of differential worth.
Like the equal protection cases, Tide VII also attempts to
eradicate reliance on stereotypes. Not surprisingly, most litigation
on this point occurs in gender discrimination claims since recent
history has forced employers to become sensitive to overt
suggestions of racism. The leading case is Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 72 in which the Court recognized that employer decisions
based on gender stereotypes are actionable under Title VII. The
plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was a senior manager who had been passed
over for partnership in a leading accounting firm. There were
concerns, perhaps legitimate, that her abrasive personality unfairly
affected the support staff. Certain partners, however, viewed her
behavior as inappropriately masculine, objected to foul language
from a woman, and advised her to "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry. ,171 In pertinent part, the Court was
called upon to decide what constituted discrimination "because of'
sex under Title VII.
Justice Brennan identified sex stereotyping as a form of gender
discrimination that Congress intended to eliminate. 7 4 He specifi-
cally regarded stereotyping as unfair because it attributes group
characteristics to an individual, thus preventing individual, merit-
based evaluations of workers. 75 Price Waterhouse was neither the first
170. Id. at 65.
171. Id. at 65 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980)).
172. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
173. Id. at 235.
174. Id. at 251.
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming
or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for [i]n
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.




nor last Tide VII case in which the Court regarded sex stereotyping
as discriminatory. In the earlier Manhart decision, the Court took
for granted that Tide VII forbade employment decisions based on
stereotypes, and held that a defendant's practice of charging fe-
male employees higher pension contributions because of their
greater average longevity improperly substituted a gender-based
assumption for an individual determination. 17 The more recent
decision in Oncale, in which the Court determined that Tide VII
hostile environment claims applied to male-on-male harassment,
1 7 7
involved facts that suggested a violent form of stereotyping. The
plaintiff had been subjected to graphic, sexually suggestive assaults
by other male employees who taunted him for being a homosex-
ual, 178 and presumably not manly enough to work in the tough
environment on an oil platform.
Title VII likewise parallels the equal protection cases' conclusion
that race, gender, and other immutable characteristics are rarely
relevant in the workplace. The irrelevance of race was established
early in the case law. Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Griggs in
1971 noted that the enacting Congress intended that Title VII di-
rect employers' attention toward actual job qualifications, "so that
race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant."179 Justice
Brennan's opinion in Price Waterhouse reiterated this point, specifi-
cally concluding that the language of Section 703 (a) (1) forbidding
discrimination "because of ... sex" means that "gender must be
irrelevant to employment decisions." 180 In rare cases consideration
of race and like categories is permitted in the remedial phases of
Title VII. The Court in Weber, for example, construed the Act to
permit voluntary affirmative actions programs when there is his-
tory of discrimination in the relevant labor market.'"' Racial and
like categories are inevitably "relevant" in any attempt to correct
176. Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
It is now well recognized that employment decisions cannot be predicated on mere
"stereotyped" impressions about the characteristics of males or females. Myths and
purely habitual assumptions about a woman's inability to perform certain kinds of
work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals,
or for paying them less.
Id. at 702.
177. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
178. Id. at 77.
179. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971); see also Manhart, 435 U.S. at
708 (noting that Title VII was designed to make race irrelevant).
180. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).
181. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (permitting voluntarily adopted private-sector affirmative
action plans that eliminate "traditionally segregated job categories").
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discrimination. Their use in Title VII parallels the equitable power
of a federal court to fashion category-conscious decrees to remedy
equal protection violations.1s 2 The underlying conduct which
prompts that remedy, however, is likely to involve decisions based
on irrelevancies.
The limited nature of the BFOQ defense's" also underscores the
T l i4 d a
irrelevance of immutable characteristics in the employment
context. Section 703(e) (1) of the Act creates an affirmative
defense: "[I] t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise. The defense is conspicuously
not available in cases of race discrimination, creating an inference
that race can never be a valid workplace criterion. Indeed, so far
as sex discrimination claims go, the statutory concession that
gender may be relevant parallels the assumption in the equal
protection context that gender classifications are more likely than
racial ones to be genuinely relevant, thus receiving only
intermediate scrutiny by the courts.
182. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirm-
ing decree in school desegregation case utilizing racial enrollment quotas).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2001). See generallyJoanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs
to the Lord": Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right To Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 275, 285-87 (1994) (summarizing Title VII's BFOQ requirements).
184. The inclusion of religion among Title VII's protected classes is curious. Unlike
race, gender or national origin, religious affiliations are hardly immutable. Judge Ruben
picks up on the difference in Gloor when he comments that Title VII does not protect muta-
ble characteristics except religion, but had no reason to pursue the point in a language
case. Gloor, 618 E2d at 270. Several commentators have also observed that religion is the
one mutable trait covered by Title VII. See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic
of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 8 (2000) (stating discrimination laws
forbid discrimination based upon religious beliefs even though not immutable); Mark
Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't Ask; If It Is, Don't Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and the Consti-
tution, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 375, 403 (1995) (noting that religion is not genetically
determined and the believers can convert). One court has casually referred to religion in
dicta as an immutable personal characteristic under Title VII. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569
F.2d 1231, 1236 (3d Cir. 1977). It is probably more sensible to assign Title VII's prohibitions
against religious discrimination to a First Amendment rather than Fourteenth (i.e. anti-
discrimination) model, where concepts of immutability don't come into play. See Kenji Yo-
shino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 928-29 (2002).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2001).
186. See 110 CONG. REc. 2550-63 (1964) (rejecting amendment adding race to BFOQ
provisions); cf Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 74 F.Supp.2d 321, 337
(S.D. N.Y. 1999) (noting that "no court has actually approved of a race-based BFOQ").
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Even though Title VII does acknowledge the possibility that a
qualification based on sex or national origin may be apt, the pre-
sumption of irrelevance is still firm. Section 703(e) (1)'s language
permitting gender classifications when "reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise"
18 7
has been construed narrowly to require a showing that the rule is
necessary to the continuing viability of the employer's opera-
tions,.. or that loss of the rule would destroy the "essence of the
business operation." s9 Relatively few classifications will survive this
test, again suggesting that gender and national origin distinctions
in the workplace are largely beside the point. 19 The law on this
point comports with common sense. On rare occasion, sex or na-
tional origin may make a difference in job performance. An
impresario could argue that a man must play Henry V or the Duke
of Exeter in the Shakespearean history. A restauranteur could in-
sist that a Parisian be head chef of a French restaurant. Neither
could get away with hiring only men for the clean up crews.
It is instructive to compare Title VII's insistence that immutable
traits are largely irrelevant with the provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. The ADA explicitly treats disability as an im-
portant ingredient in a wide range of decisions. A few examples
should suffice to make the point. Title I of the Act, which governs
employment, limits protections to "qualified individual s] with a
disability" "' who are defined as persons who can perform the "es-
sential functions" of the job in question with or without aS192
reasonable accommodation. Regulations issued under Title II of
the ADA (Public Services) prohibit provision of separate benefits
or services unless necessary to give disabled individuals opportuni-
ties that are "as effective as those provided to others., 93 Title III,
194governing public accommodations, has a similar provision. The
187. Id.
188. Compare, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding gender re-
strictions on hiring of women as prison guards as necessary) with UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 203-04 (1991) (holding employer rule barring fertile women from jobs
with risk of exposure to lead violates Title VII).
189. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333.
190. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX's Sex-based Proportion-
ality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 731, 743-44
(2003) (stating that Title VII requires "direct competition between women and men" and
that sex is rarely a BFOQ); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (2004) (EEOC Guidelines on sex
discrimination) (treating BFOQ defense narrowly).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
192. Id. § 12111(8).
193. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (1) (iv) (2003).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000) (prohibiting unnecessary separate bene-
fits).
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ADA generally depends upon a system of requiring covered enti-
ties to provide disabled individuals with accommodations that
facilitate participation in important phases of public life. 95 All
these provisions presume that consideration of a person's disabili-
ties is not only relevant, but useful in decisionmaking. While the
ADA is a civil rights statute in a general sense, it does not fit easily
within the confines of the traditional civil rights model.
96
Finally, Title VII adopts to a great degree the constitutional view
that discrimination is the product of intention. Section 703(a) (1)
of the Act forbids discrimination "because of" race, etc. Claimants
pursuing Title VII claims under a disparate treatment theory (dis-
cussed immediately below) are required to establish through .direct
or indirect evidence that the defendant acted with a prejudicial
state of mind. Justice Brennan's opinion in Price Waterhouse posits
that this requirement is met when an employer admits, were he to
speak truthfully, that he acted because an employee or an appli-
cant was a woman. 9 7 The assumption is that actions motivated by
awareness of a protected characteristic reflect bias. Defenses to
disparate treatment claims focus on dispelling the inference of
prejudicial motivation. Employers are required to respond to an
established prima facie case of discrimination by articulating a le-
gitimate, non-discriminatory reason for taking an adverse action
against the employee. 98 To the extent that the employers' actions
are rational business practices, they are deemed to be unbiased.
Disparate impact cases, in which the plaintiff argues that a superfi-
cially neutral practice unjustifiably disadvantages a protected
group, do not require a showing of bias. I will argue below, how-
ever, that the disparate impact theory should also be regarded as
raising an inference of bias.
2. Skepticism and Modes of Proof Under Title VII-As originally en-
acted, Title VII established an antidiscrimination mandate for
employers, but was silent as to how claimants should prove that
discrimination occurred. The omission was significant, although
195. See, e.g., id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring employers to make accommodation to
known disabilities of employees).
196. For attempts to relate the ADA to the civil rights model, see, for example, Robert
L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413, 492-522 (1991); Diller, supra
note 76; S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability Law
Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603 (2001); Arlene B. Mayerson & Silvia Yee, The ADA
and Models of Equality, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 535 (2001); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA's Revolv-
ingDoor: Inherent laws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (2001).
197. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 250.
198. See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing burdens of proof in disparate treatment analysis).
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expected: statutes establishing new principles or reordering large
swaths of American society will often lack the practical guidance of
a body of judicial decisions. Direct proof of discrimination is hard
to come by. Most employers and managers, whether acting in good
faith or bad, are smart enough not to use any phrases that might
imply racial or other animus when discussing employment matters
publicly. '9 They also do not leave notes in personnel files indicat-
ing that a worker has been fired for being black, female, or a
Latina. Recognizing the difficulty of proof under these circum-
stances, the Court devised alternative means of proving
discrimination that were eventually codified in Title VII by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991: disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact. °° Either test reflects the skeptical assumptions of the
antidiscrimination model, already developed in the equal protec-
tion context, that employment criteria based on immutable traits
are likely to be discriminatory.
a. Disparate Treatment-Recovery under a disparate treatment
theory requires proof of discriminatory intent. Occasionally there
is direct proof of animus, for example when a supervisor loses his
composure and discharges a worker in a fit of racial epithets, or is
overheard using phrases such as "Spanish hurts my ears. 2 0 1 Such
instances are, of course, rare, therefore most disparate treatment
cases are made out under the McDonnell Douglas framework for
demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination. Speaking gen-
erally, the McDonnell Douglas framework raises an inference of
discrimination when a plaintiff makes a threshold showing that he
or she was similarly situated to other workers but was treated dif-
ferently. The test is flexible and adapts to the specific employment
context. In failure to hire cases, for example, plaintiffs may offer
evidence that they: (1) are members of a protected class (e.g., a ra-
cial group); (2) applied for a job for which they were qualified;
(3) were rejected; and, (4) the position remained open and the em-
202ployer continued to seek applicants. By offering such evidence,
199. 1 LEX K LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.01[1], at 8-6 (2d ed. 1994)
(employers are "too sophisticated to profess their prejudices on paper ... before wit-
nesses"); see also U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
(noting that there is seldom "'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental proc-
esses").
200. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2001) (setting burden of proof for disparate
impact claims); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2001) (permitting damages for intentional
discrimination but not disparate impact claims).
201. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (holding that a
plaintiff may establish discrimination through direct evidence).
202. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Tex. Dept. of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
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plaintiffs raise a prima facie case of discrimination that is sufficient
to avoid summary judgment or motions to dismiss. Employers then
must respond by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory rea-
son for their actions. °3 Once employers meet their burden of
production, the prima facie case loses its significance, and the
charge of discrimination is ready for trial, where the plaintiff car-
204
ries the ultimate burden of persuasion. To pick another
example, plaintiffs alleging discriminatory discharge may show:
(1) membership in a protected class; (2) qualification for the job
held; (3) discharge; and, (4) the position remained open and was
ultimately filled by a member outside of plaintiff's group.
McDonnell Douglas's shifting allocations of proof are a practical
and reasonable response to the difficulties of acquiring evidence
in an area of human interaction where subjective intentions are
pervasive. Justice Powell reasoned in Burdine that raising a prima
facie case eliminates the two most common nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for an adverse employment action, i.e., that the plaintiff was
unqualified for the position held or sought, or that no job vacancy
existed.2°' At this point, we should be getting suspicious of the em-
ployer's motives. Our experience in the equal protection cases has
taught us that racially conscious decisions are likely to reflect
prejudice at some level. Burdine carries this skepticism into Title
VII by explaining that the prima facie case "raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise
unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration
of impermissible factors."2 0 7 Establishing a prima facie case does not
tell us specifically which concerns of the antidiscrimination model
have been implicated in the present litigation. Our skepticism
about the employer's actions, rather, is generalized and only re-
quires that he now articulate some reasonable basis for his actions
that explain away the possibility of animus, stereotyping or imper-
missible use of group characteristics.
As a practical matter, plaintiffs tend to avoid using the disparate
treatment model in language discrimination claims. It is difficult to
point to circumstances in the typical discharge case that give rise to
a inference of animus. Workplace language rules are superficially
neutral standards that are applied evenhandedly to every worker in
203. See, e.g., McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
204. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Aikins, 460 U.S. at 716.
205. See, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. V. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at
252-53.
206. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
207. Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
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a unit. Employers do not, for obvious reasons, discharge Chicano
workers for speaking Spanish while tolerating Spanish
conversations among the Anglo employees. Also, defendants who
employ a significant number of workers who speak a LOTE
probably do so because of the demographics of their local hiring
pool.2 08 Chances are high that replacement workers will share the
linguistic or ethnic traits of a discharged worker. This is not to say
that discrimination does not occur when a worker is replaced by
another of his own group. Just as the female plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse was allegedly denied a partnership in a national
accounting firm for being too macho, it is easily conceivable that
one Chicano worker may be let go because his use of Spanish
makes him seem uppity to a supervisor. Proof of this sort of
animus, however, is elusive and rarely can be teased out of the
McDonnell Douglas framework.
b. Disparate Impact-Disparate impact, a.k.a. adverse impact, is
the usual basis for language discrimination claims under Title VII.
Although often brought by individual plaintiffs, these claims are in
effect miniature class actions alleging that an employer's facially
neutral rule has a disproportionate and disadvantaging effect on a
protected class of workers. To make out a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact, the plaintiff must show that a challenged practice has
an adverse impact on a protected group. 20 Height and weight re-
quirements, for example, tend to have a disparate impact on
female job applicants. Often the adverse impact is shown by sta-
212tistical evidence. Once impact is established, the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove a business necessity for the rule or practice
213
at issue. Should the employer bear its burden of persuasion as to
business necessity, the plaintiff has a last chance to establish that
the employer has failed to implement an alternative practice that
meets business requirements but imposes a lesser burden on the
protected class. 
4
Disparate impact claims reflect antidiscrimination principles,
though less obviously than claims brought under a disparate
208. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text (noting concentration of persons
who speak a LOTE in ten states).
209. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
211. See, e.g. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight require-
ments for prison guard position tended to disqualify women applicants).
212. See I BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAw 87 (3d ed. 1996).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (ii) (2000).
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treatment theory. Adverse impact plaintiffs are targeting facially
neutral rules that by definition do not treat workers within
protected groups differently. Moreover, the Court has refused
from the beginning to impose any requirement that plaintiffs
demonstrate prejudice or animus on the part of employers, either
directly or by inference. Disparate impact theory debuted in 1971
in Grigs, where Chief Justice Burger stated: "[A]bsence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability," '
and that "Congress directed [Title VII toward] the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation. 2 1 6 Although
there is some reason to doubt that the enacting Congress
contemplated disparate impact claims under Title VII,1 the Civil
218Rights Act of 1991 eliminated any doubts by codifying them.
Recently in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that disparate impact claims require no showing that an
employer had a subjective intent to discriminate. 21 9 Thus, Griggs
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 can be read to create a substantive
prohibition against unnecessary employment practices, however
motivated, that adversely affect minorities, women, and other
protected groups.
By focusing on the protection of groups from the unintentional
effects of neutral practices, the adverse impact theory appears to
diverge from the anti-discrimination model's rejection of employ-
ment decisions made with conscious regard to stereotypes or
immutable characteristics. Disparate treatment plaintiffs are charged
with the burden of proving circumstances from which one can jus-
tifiably infer animus or stereotyping. A prima facie case under
disparate treatment theory will boil down to allegations that the
aggrieved plaintiff was similarly situated to other workers who were
not similarly disadvantaged by an employer's actions. For example,
a female plaintiff might allege that she was better qualified for a
position but was passed over in favor of a male with inferior cre-
dentials. The permutations are infinite, but we are willing to
215. Gris, 401 U.S. at 432.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill,"a Codifica-
tion of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287,
293 (1993) (suggesting the Congress enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have re-
jected disparate impact claims).
218. See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, SU-
pra note 212, at 85 (discussing codification of disparate impact rules).
219. 124 S. Ct. 513, 519 (2003).
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declare a prima facie case once the allegations are substantial
enough to force a defendant to explain its actions.
In disparate impact cases, however, the mere existence of a dis-
parity of effect along racial, ethnic or gender lines does not usually
create a strong inference of prejudicial motivation. If differential
treatment is the heart of discrimination, the application of uni-
form qualification standards or work rules regardless of a worker's
identity does little to suggest a reliance on stereotypes or bias.
Contrary group-related outcomes may well reflect a good faith de-
cision by an employer that has "discriminatory consequences." To
be clear, I am not suggesting that all disparate impact scenarios are
innocent. The facts of Griggs suggested that the employer was using
newly imposed requirements of high school diplomas and aptitude
test scores to maintain a segregated workplace."O I am suggesting,
however, that in the run of cases disparate outcomes are far less
indicative of prejudicial intentions.
Some commentators view disparate impact cases as a thinly dis-
guised form of affirmative action.22' There is some merit to this
argument in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncements that
disparate impact liability exists independent of an employer's in-222
tent. Nevertheless, adverse impact analysis also serves the
function of opening the courts to discrimination claims that would
otherwise fail for lack of proof. As already stated, employers gener-
ally are not foolish enough to state an illegal motivation for an
adverse employment decision. Indeed, well counseled employers
say as little as possible when discharging an employee. Disparate
treatment analysis fills much of the proof gap by permitting an in-
ference of discrimination from unequal treatment. Inference by
comparison, however, is not useful in situations where treatment is
uniform. Hence our choice is either to concede that superficially
neutral practices-however motivated-are outside the effective
220. Duke Power had organized its Dan River plant into five departments. Black em-
ployees were restricted to the Labor Department while the four other "operating"
departments hired white workers. Beginning in 1955, all departments except Labor re-
quired a high school diploma for initial hires. After enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Duke Power lifted its restriction of black employees to Labor but also imposed a new
requirement that transfers from Labor to other departments have a high school diploma.
The fact that white pre-1955 hires without high school diplomas continued to work and
advance in the operating departments created distinct suspicions about Duke Power's cor-
porate motives. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28. Similarly Duke Power's decision to require
successful scores on two aptitude tests for news hires in all departments except labor, as well
as a high school diploma, seemed suspicious. See id. at 428.
221. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 217 (interpreting disparate impact as form of affirma-
tive action).
222. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 40 (holding that disparate impact does not require showing
of intent to discriminate).
FALL 2004]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
reach of Title VII, or to erect a presumption that disparate out-
comes are ill motivated. Disparate impact cases silently do the
latter.
By raising a prima facie case upon a showing that a neutral rule
adversely impacts a protected group, a disparate impact plaintiff in
effect creates an evidentiary presumption that the rule has been
influenced by an illegitimate consideration. A literal reading of
Griggs and its progeny might lead one to believe that the
undesirability of adverse consequences arising from workplace
policies that cannot meet a business justification (without regard
to stereotypes connected with immutable traits) is a sufficient basis
for creating disparate impact liability. Accepting this argument,
however, implicitly ratifies criticisms that disparate impact is a
front for affirmative action. The better approach is to regard proof
of adverse impact as evidence of discriminatory intent subject to
rebuttal by the defendant. The burden-shifting scheme for
disparate impact cases does so in practice. Title VII does not say
this explicitly, but the presumption of wrongful motivation follows
from the fact that the burden shifts to the employer affirmatively
to demonstrate that the rule is "job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.,2  Business
necessity represents a dividing line between legitimate and
forbidden motivations. If an employer has acted in a commercially
reasonable way, then we can safely release him from the
presumption of prejudice.
Recast as a presumption of discriminatory intent, disparate im-
pact claims partake of many aspects of the anti-discrimination
model. The de facto denial of employment opportunities on racial
and related grounds, even if ultimately justifiable, triggers con-
cerns for the dignitary (and pecuniary) interests of certain classes
of our citizenry. While unequal outcomes from neutral rules are
less suspicious than those from differential treatment, our national
history of discrimination against particular groups calls for some
level of skepticism whenever employment practices yield a dis-
criminatory result. It is not unreasonable to question whether
stereotypes inspired by immutable characteristics have led to par-
ticular results in the workplace.
That said, I would not argue that our present system of disparate
impact analysis is finely tuned to this task. For example, we place
defendants in disparate impact claims under a burden of persuasion
to offer a business justification whenever plaintiffs demonstrate
223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (i) (2001).
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that a neutral rule produces unequal outcomes for a protected
class.224 Disparate treatment defendants, in contrast, are held to a
lesser burden in responding to a prima facie case, namely to articu-
225late a legitimate reason for a different outcome. The disparity of
evidentiary burdens is remarkable, given that the inference of dis-
crimination will normally be stronger in a disparate treatment
case.
The concepts of 'job relatedness" and "business necessity" are
also not well defined. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991226 indicates that Congress intended that these terms have
the meaning attributed to them in the Griggs case, and that it
meant to overturn the pro-defendant construction of Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Antonio, which asked only that employers demon-
strate that a challenged practice "serve[], in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer. 2 27 The leading trea-
tise on employment discrimination notes that, although it is clear
that Congress intended in the 1991 Act to restore the status quo
before Ward's Cove, it is not evident that Griggs and other pre-Wards
Cove decisions viewed "business necessity" as requiring a height-
221
ened showing of necessity. If business necessity does indeed
entail more than a showing of business advantage, then one might
argue that Title VII exceeds the antidiscrimination model's focus
on irrelevancy of immutable characteristics in favor of affirmative
action.
224. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
226. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 212, at 106 (reviewing legislative history
of Civil Rights Act of 1991).
227. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
228. 1 Lindemann & Grossman, supra note 212, at 107. Lindemann and Grossman note
that language in Griggs implied that the terms "job related" and "" business necessity" were
synonymous:
[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be re-
lated to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
Id. (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431). They further note that the substantive requirements of
these terms were left unclear, leading the lower courts to split interpretations. Id. (compar-
ing Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 E2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971) (holding that the business necessity defense requires employers to prove that a
practice is "necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business") with Contreras v.
City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a defendant must
show that the practice serves employer's legitimate interest, but not that it is necessary or
required)).
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It is more reasonable, however, to view any heightened interpre-
tation of job relatedness and business necessity as a prophylactic
evidentiary requirement that reduces the possibility that employers
will engage in the socially unacceptable consideration of irrelevan-
cies, such as race or gender, in the workplace. A similar argument
can be made regarding a plaintiffs rejoinder arguments that effec-
tive practices with less discriminatory impact are available to
employers. One might say that Title VII is forcing a court to
choose between two legitimate, rational practices. The response is
similar: in the event that two practices can meet the employer's
needs 2 2 adopting the one with less adverse impact decreases the
likelihood that impermissible considerations taint workplace
judgments.
At any rate, there is little wonder that plaintiffs in language dis-
crimination cases have opted for the disparate impact strategy.
First and foremost, adverse impact claims require no proof of ani-
mus, only disparate impact.2 30 The aforementioned difficulties of
proving animus by direct or inferential means under a disparate
treatment theory naturally lead language discrimination plaintiffs
toward the adverse impact side of Title VII. There are other advan-
tages. It is relatively easy to argue that a language minority has
been affected by a workplace language rule. A rule requiring that
workers communicate exclusively in English can safely be ignored
by native-English speakers. Employees who speak Spanish as their
native tongue must alter their speech behaviors to conform to the
policy. 231 Most courts, however, have read Title VII to require a
229. Certain critical issues regarding practices with less impact are unresolved by the
courts. There is no consensus on how effective a substitute practice must be, i.e., must the
alternative be equally efficacious or no more costly? Second, there is disagreement over
whether plaintiffs must show that employers had actual knowledge of the alternative. See
generally id. at 87.
230. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31 (1970).
231. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486:
It is beyond dispute that ... if the English-only policy causes any adverse effects,
those effects will be suffered disproportionately by those of Hispanic origin. The vast
majority of those workers at Spun Steak who speak a language other than English-
and virtually all those employees for whom English is not a first language-are His-
panic. It is of no consequence that not all Hispanic employees of Spun Steak speak
Spanish; nor is it relevant that some non-Hispanic workers may speak Spanish. If the




demonstration of significant impact on the protected group.2" The
Spun Steak court, for example, turned away a language discrimina-
tion claim on grounds that the effect on Spanish speaking
233
employees was not significantly adverse. Once over this hurdle,
however, the burden shifts permanently to the defendant to justify
practices with discriminatory effects as "job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity. 2 3 4 Even if the
employer meets this ill-placed burden, the plaintiff has one more
bite at apple, i.e., he may argue that a less restrictive option was
available.
IV. TITLE VII LANGUAGE CLAIMS AND
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MODEL
I have argued in the preceding Part that Title VII has developed
around an anti-discrimination model that seeks to promote equal-
ity through taking certain tainted criteria out of an employer's
assessments. The key assumptions of the civil rights model are that
decisions that touch on immutable characteristics, such as race or
gender, yield results that are unfair because they demean, leave
the individual unable to respond, and introduce irrelevancies into
employment decisionmaking. The solution is a historically in-
formed skepticism that is executed though the evidentiary
presumptions of disparate treatment and adverse impact analysis.
Even proponents of minority language rights in the workplace
must concede that Title VII is an awkward policy tool. Language
discrimination claims rarely invoke the assumptions of the civil
rights model. Even if we presume that language is an inseparable
aspect of ethnicity or national origin (I will challenge this assump-
tion momentarily), we must acknowledge that language is neither
an immutable characteristic nor is it irrelevant to the proper man-
agement of the workplace. In fact, the vast majority of workers who
speak a LOTE are bilingual and capable of communicating well in
English. The problem is, therefore, not whether employees are
being unfairly and irrationally judged; rather, the issue is whether
232. See id. at 1485 (citing Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 705 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984) ("[T]he requirements of a prima facie disparate
impact case ... are in some respects more exacting than those of a disparate treatment
case.").
233. Id.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2001).
235. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
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and to what degree employees should be granted a right to com-
municate in a language of their choice. The antidiscrimination
model is not designed to answer questions of this sort.
In this Part, I argue that language discrimination claims do not
fit the anti-discrimination model utilized by Title VII. Subpart A
begins the analysis by examining the statute itself and its develop-
ment by the courts. I review the legislative history of Title VII and
conclude that the enacting Congress probably did not intend to
offer protection against language discrimination. I also dismiss ar-
guments that subsequent legislation or administrative agency
actions have effectively broadened Title VII to reach language
claims. I conclude Subpart A by examining issues that have been
left open by the courts. My conclusion is that Title VII as presently
construed cannot be stretched to reach language discrimination
claims.
Beginning with Subpart B, I shift emphasis from what Title VII
actually does to what it might do to promote the equality interests
of workers who speak LOTEs. One key assumption of the civil
rights model is that persons should be protected against considera-
tion of certain defining conditions that are immutable and
irrelevant. Subpart B argues that language is hardly an immutable
trait, but instead a characteristic within personal control. Because
individuals are capable of learning new languages-and in the
American context have done so admirably well-the anti-
discrimination model's concerns over burdening them with ines-
capable stereotypes applies with diminished force. In limited
instances, persons will tend to revert from English to their primary
languages though a phenomenon called "code-switching." Design-
ing claims that reach these occasional lapses but not volitional
behavior would be prohibitively difficult. I also review, with a large
dose of skepticism, the related argument that use of one's primary
language is sometimes involuntary and language is an essential as-
pect of ethnic or cultural identity.
In Part IV(C), I move on to the employer's case for workplace
language restrictions. While language rules obviously burden em-
ployees who speak a LOTE as their primary language, they also
serve important and neutral business purposes. Hence there is lit-
tle reason to fear that irrelevant factors will taint an employer's
judgments. My ultimate conclusion, given in Subpart D, is that is-
sues of language regulation in the workplace trigger so few of the
interests protected by the civil rights model that it would be inap-
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propriate to employ the skeptical framework of Title VII to such
claims.
A. Does Title VII Embrace Language Discrimination Claims?
1. The Original 1964 Enactment-Language is not mentioned in
the text of Title VII. The operative language of Section 703(a) (1)
of the Act forbids discrimination in employment "because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'236 A com-
panion provision, Section 703(a) (2), outlaws attempts "to limit,
237
segregate, or classify" employees on the same grounds. Nor does
the topic of language discrimination come up in the legislative his-
tory of the Act. The closest approximation is the Act's recognition
of "national origin" as a basis for discrimination. One can fashion
arguments in the abstract that there is a relationship between an
immigrant's country of origin and his primary language. There is
scant evidence, however, that the enacting Congress entertained
211them.
Little was said during the Civil Rights Act's journey through
Congress to clarify the meaning of "national origin." Direct discus-
sion of the meaning of "national origin" is confined to two
statements made during floor debate. Representative Roosevelt
offered a restrictive opinion that national origin means "the coun-. ,239
try from which you or your forebears came from." He apparently
wanted to make clear that labor unions could utilize a language
BFOQ for its own hires when the union was dealing with immi-
grant workers who spoke the language of their homelands.2
Representative Dent added that "[n]ational origin, of course, has
nothing to do with color, religion, or the race of an individual."
241
Dent further added that "[a] man may have migrated here from
Great Britain and still be a colored person."242 The implications of
protecting citizens from national origin discrimination also
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001) (emphasis added).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (2001).
238. See Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88-89 (characterizing the legislative history of "national
origin" discrimination as slight). See generally Perea, supra note 72, at 817-21 (reviewing
legislation history and concluding that Congress understood national origin in Title VII to
mean the nation of one's birth or ancestry).
239. 110 CONG. REc. 2549 (1964).
240. 110 CONG. REc. 2550 (1964).
241. 110 CONG. REc. 2549 (1964).
242. Id.
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prompted scattered comments. Representative Rodino opined that
national origin might be a bona fide occupational qualification for
employees in an ethnic restaurant.43 Senator Humphrey stated
that African-Americans had been denied access to public facilities
because of "their ethnic origin, their national origin."2 4 Senator
Dirksen thought that the national origin terminology might pose
problems for defense contractors requiring security clearances.2 45
Congress appears to have equated national origin with "ancestry";
the latter term was deleted from the final version of the Act as re-
dundant.246
There is no clue in the legislative history that Congress was con-
cerned with ethnic or national traits such as language. Congressman
Dent's statement separating the concept of national origin fromS . 247
color, religion, and race has been criticized as artificial. Perhaps
he did overlook rather obvious connections between country of
origin and a variety of traits such as ethnicity, religion, or lan-
guage. Perhaps he felt that such qualities were protected by other
terms within Title VII. Who knows? The accuracy of Dent's state-
ment, however, has nothing to do with the task of divining
Congressional intent. Nor should the lack of focus on language
surprise us. Congress's prime motivation in forbidding racial dis-
crimination in employment was to protect African-Americans from
24"
arbitrary and unfair exclusions from the labor market. America
in 1964 was a black and white society. African-Americans consti-
tuted 10% of the population while Caucasians made up most of
the balance.2 49 The great influx of immigrants from Latin America
243. 110 CONG. REC. 2549 (1964).
244. 110 CONG. REc. 12,580 (1964). See also id. at 6562 (statement of Sen. Kuchel) (re-
ferring to problems faced by "a Negro or a Puerto Rican or an Indian or a Japanese-
American or an American of Mexican descent"); id. at 7375 (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(stating that his home state of Massachusetts had "absorbed every racial nationality group,
from the Puritans to the Poles to the Puerto Ricans").
245. 110 CONG. Rc. 6450 (1964).
246. SeeEspinoza, 414 U.S. at89 (citing H.R. REP. No. 914 (1964)).
247. See Perea, supra note 72, at 818 n.76 (citing Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Per-
spectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 379 and Martha Minow,
Equalities, 88J. PHIL. 633, 635 (1991)).
248. See, e.g., 110 CONG. Rac. 2556 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (explaining
that the purpose of Title VII was "to extend to Negro citizens the same rights and the same
opportunities that white Americans take for granted"); id. at 7218 (statement of Sen. Clark)
("[Title VII] simply eliminates consideration of color from the decision to hire or pro-
mote."); id. at 110 CONG. REc. 13,088 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (explaining that Title
VII makes race an illegal consideration in denial of employment).
249. See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Any-
more, 47 STAN. L. REv. 957, 958 (1995) (citing Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of
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had not yet occurred, and thus the situation was quite different
from today where Hispanic-Americans form the largest minority
community in America.250 Fluency in English was one of the few
areas in which African-Americans did not encounter barriers to
employment, implying that language preferences were not some-
thing that concerned Congress while enacting the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The Supreme Court has construed the national origin
provision only once, holding that Title VII does not forbid dis-
crimination on the basis of citizenship but recognizing that
citizenship qualifications might be a pretext for national origin
discrimination. 1
Some lower courts have accepted the equivalence of language
and national origin for the sake of argument. Judge Rubin's
opinion in Garcia v. Gloor acknowledges the "importance of a
person's language of preference or other aspects of his national,
• . . ,,252
ethnic or racial self-identification, although he would exclude
mutable "ethnic or sociocultural traits" aside from religion from
253Title VII's concept of national origin. Other courts are somewhat
more indulgent of the connection between national origin and
language. Judge O'Scannlain's opinion in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,
for example, concedes that "[i]t cannot be gainsaid that an
individual's primary language can be an important link to his




Arguments over the connection between language and national
origin, however, have played no decisive role in the resolution of
Title VII language cases. Generally such claims are disparate im-
pact cases turned away for failure of proof. The lead case of Spun
Steak is typical. Proceeding under an adverse impact theory, bilin-
gual plaintiffs claimed that their employer's English-only policy
Commerce, Census of Population 1960, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 1, at 145 thl.
44 (1964)).
250. The 2000 Census indicated that Hispanics constituted 12.5% of the population,
compared with 12.3% for African Americans. See Census PHC-T-1, Population by Race Alone,
Race in Combination Only, Race Alone or in Combination, and Hispanic or Latino Origin, for the
United States: 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-
tl/tab03.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Hispanics
numbered 37.4 million, or 13.3% of the population, in 2002. See U.S. Census, The Hispanic
Population in the United States: March 2002, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/p20-545.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
251. Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 91-93.
252. 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352
(1991) (plurality opinion, KennedyJ.) ("Language permits an individual to express both a
personal identity and membership in a community, and those who share a common lan-
guage may interact in ways more intimate than those without this bond.").
253. Id.
254. 998 F.2d. 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993).
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disadvantaged them by depriving them of the ability to express
their cultural heritage on the job and by denying them a privilege
of employment-conversations in a preferred language-that was
available to English-speaking employees. Judge O'Scannlain ac-
knowledged that the Spanish-speaking workers felt the adverse
effects of the work rule disproportionately, but then reasoned that
such consequences were not the actual, significant impact required2,56
by a disparate impact case. The asserted injuries were, in effect,
requests for substantive privileges that other workers did not have.
Unless conferred by an employer or a collective bargaining
agreement, workers have no right to cultural expression or to con-
257
versation in any language. Hence the alleged injuries impact in a
factual, but not a legal, Title VII sense.
Because most Title VII language actions are based on disparate
impact, and since most employers retain vast discretion to set work
rules, the Spun Steak analysis has obviated the need to decide the
scope of "national origin." The adverse impact requirement does
not apply to disparate treatment claims, but these are rare in the
language context .2 5 Recently the Court had the opportunity to de-
cide whether national origin discrimination under Title VII
included language discrimination, but instead resolved Alexander v.
Sandoval by holding that plaintiffs had no private cause of action to
• . . 259
enforce disparate impact claims. Given the federal courts' cold-
ness to Tide VII language claims, I suspect that they would take a
more restrictive view of "national origin" if a decision actually
turned on the definition of this term.
A broad construction of "national origin" is not, I concede, in-
evitable. Legislation sometimes reaches situations that its framers
never contemplated. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,26°
the Court determined that Title VII reached same-sex sexual har-
assment. Justice Scalia's opinion noted that "male-on-male sexual
harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII, ", 6' but
concluded that "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the princi-
pal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils. 2 6 2 A conclusion that
255. Id. at 1486-87.
256. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
257. Id.
258. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Co., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) is a rare example of a lan-
guage discrimination claim tried in part under a disparate treatment theory.
259. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
260. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
261. Id. at 79.
262. Id. at 79-80.
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language discrimination claims are embodied in Title VII, how-
ever, would require a remarkably elastic approach to "national
origin." Same-sex harassment bears an apparent relationship to
sexual harassment in general, and can be reconciled with the text
of Title VII forbidding discrimination "because of sex. 2 63 In con-
trast, the concept of "national origin" does not so evidently include
use of language, nor does the statutory terminology necessarily
embody it. An employer who hangs out a "No Irish Need Apply"
sign would be properly sued by a plaintiff whose grandparents had
forgotten their childhood Gaelic. There are arguments that lan-
guage and race or ethnicity are inextricably linked, which I will
take up in Part IV(B). Whatever their merit, there is nothing in the
language or history of Title VII that suggests, much less compels
them.
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1991-An argument that Title VII now
embraces language discrimination claims comes not from the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, but from the legislative debate surrounding the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. The 1991 Act was intended largely to
overrule a series of narrow interpretations of Title VII and other
civil rights statutes from the Supreme Court's 1988 term.2 During
floor debate, Senator DeConcini asked Senator Kennedy about the
effects of the 1991 Act on existing EEOC guidance. The Guidelines
on Discrimination Because of National Origin had created a nearly
conclusive presumption that work rules requiring the use of Eng-
lish at all times were discriminatory; rules demanding exclusive use
of English only at certain times required that the employer show
business necessity. 5 Their colloquy was as follows:
Mr. DeConcini: I thank the Senator. I also have another mat-
ter that I would like to discuss. This is the issue of work place
rules which require the speaking of only one language. Many
of my constituents have brought to my attention an increasing
problem with non job-related discipline and termination of
people for speaking languages other than English in the
workplace. Is the Senator aware of the EEOC regulations
dealing with this problem?
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001).
264. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (finding that the "decision of the Supreme
Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), has weakened the scope
and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections"); see also, e.g., Carl Tobias, Rehnquist or
Rorty, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211, 213 (1991) (noting that Civil Rights Act of 1991 was in-
tended to correct decisions from the 1988 Term of the Court).
265. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7.
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Mr. Kennedy: Yes, the EEOC promulgated such regulations in
1980.
Mr. DeConcini: These regulations reflect the fact that the
primary language of an individual is often an essential na-
tional origin characteristic. Does the Senator agree that these
regulations found in 29 CFR 16067.7 [sic] provide a sound
and effective method for dealing with this problem?
Mr. Kennedy: Yes, I agree that this regulation has worked well
during the past 11 years it has been in effect.
Mr. DeConcini: Does the substitute to S. 1745 in any way ad-
versely affect the EEOC regulation on language use in the
workplace.
Mr. Kennedy: No, it does not.
Mr. DeConcini: Therefore, if S. 1745 is passed and signed
into law by the President, the EEOC regulations would be
consistent with [T]itle VII as amended by S. 1745.
266Mr. Kennedy: That is correct.
I will defer comment on the EEOC Guidance until the following
section. For the moment, the important question is whether the
floor debate regarding the EEOC regulations reveals an intent by
Congress to expand Title VII to cover language discrimination
claims. The answer is far from clear, but I doubt that this is so. Ide-
ally a legislative decision to expand or clarify the scope of a statute
would be expressed by an explicit textual charge, something like:
"National origin discrimination under Section 703(a) (1-2) of this
Act shall include claims of discrimination based on primary lan-
guage." Such a formulation would undoubtedly establish plain
statutory meaning to which the Supreme Court would likely pay
261
significant deference. In the absence of direct statutory amend-
ment, we would prefer a statement in a committee report
266. 137 CONG. REc. 15,489.
267. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (applying plain mean-
ing doctrine to disallow consideration of corrective measures in determining whether
plaintiffs were disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act.). See generally NoRMANJ.





indicating a view that Title VII reached language claims, al-
269
though this method of proof is hardly a guarantee of success.
Here we have neither of the preferred expressions of legislative
will. Instead, we have the opinion of two Senators confirming an
agency rule but not precisely saying that Tide VII directly forbids
language discrimination.
At best, we can conclude that the 1991 Act drew language dis-
crimination claims into the national origin category only by
inference. One can argue that Congress legislates against a regula-
tory background that often gives content to statutory provisions. In
Heckler v. Turner, for example, the Court construed a section of the
Social Security Act dealing with calculation of "earned income"
under the former AFDC program in line with a pre-existing HEW
regulation excluding income tax withholdings from calculations,
although the Act was silent as to the issue. The Turner Court
pointed to the "administrative background" as an indication of
Congress's intent.7  Similarities between the Civil Rights Act of
1991 and the Social Security provision in Heckler, however, end
quickly. Provisions relating to the calculation of earned income
under the AFDC program fell within the focus of the 1981 Social
Security Act amendments in OBRA (Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
272tion Act). Language discrimination claims had little to do with
the corrective purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The 1991
Act was intended largely to reinvigorate disparate impact claims
after the Court had savaged them during its 1988 Term. Congress
did so by explicitly codifying disparate impact claims. Expanding
or clarifying the scope of national origin discrimination had noth-
ing to do with the statutory agenda.
Although we often give deference to statements by committee
273
chairmen or legislative sponsors during floor debate, Senator
Kennedy's comments seem isolated. The Court's recent decision
268. See SINGER, supra note 267, § 11:14 (explaining that legislative committee reports
"provide the key to general vindication, validation and acceptance of the legislative proc-
ess."); 2A id. § 48:06 (reports of standing committees are sources for determining intent of
legislature).
269. See, e.g., Peirce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1998) (holding that the
House Committee report relating to 1985 re-enactment of Equal Access to justice Act is not
an authoritative statement of what the original enacting Congress intended in 1980); Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (holding that approval of
SEC practice in committee report attendant too isolated to presume Congressional intent
to alter meaning of re-enacted provision).
270. Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 195 (1985).
271. Id.
272. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97- 35, 95 Stat. 357.
273. SINGER, supra note 267, § 48:14 (deference to statements of committeemen); 2A
id. § 48:15 (deference to statements of bill sponsors).
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in Cline, moreover, indicates a diminishing interest in crediting
274
statements of bill sponsors. Respondents in Cline relied on state-
ments of Senator Yarborough, a sponsor of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, to argue that the Act protected
younger workers from discrimination against older workers within
• 275
the 40 year or older protected class. Justice Souter rejected the
argument, reasoning that Yarborough's statements were the only
treatment of the issue in the legislative history and were consis-
.. . . .. 176
tently contradicted by judicial interpretations. In other words,
Yarborough was a solitary and mistaken voice. The Kennedy-
DeConcini colloquy is a similarly isolated statement from a debate
on a statute that did not address language claims and which re-
ferred to an EEOC regulation that the lower courts have largely
277
rejected. At any rate, an equally plausible construction of the
senatorial exchange is that they regarded the Guidance as a valid
administrative agency action. This is an altogether different con-
cept which we will now discuss.
3. EEOC Guidelines-Whatever ambiguity may inhere in the
statutory concept of national origin, the EEOC has issued rules
that unambiguously treat language discrimination as a violation of
Title VII under prescribed circumstances. In its Guidelines on
Discrimination because of National Origin, the Commission provides
for "Speak-English-only rules" as follows:
(a) When Applied at all Times. A rule requiring employees to
speak only English at all times in the workplace is a burden-
some term and condition of employment. The primary
language of an individual is often an essential national origin
characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the
workplace, from speaking their primary language or the lan-
guage they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an
individual's employment opportunities on the basis of na-
tional origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority,
isolation and intimidation based on national origin which
could result in a discriminatory working environment. There-
fore, the Commission will presume that such a rule violates
Title VII and will closely scrutinize it.
274. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
275. See id. at 1247.
276. Id. at 1247-48.
277. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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(b) When Applied Only at Certain Times. An employer may
have a rule requiring that employees speak only in English at
certain times where the employer can show that the rule is
justified by business necessity.
There is also a notice provision requiring that employers inform
workers of the "general circumstances when speaking only in Eng-
lish is required and of the consequences of violating the rule.
279
Adopted in 1980 in response to the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Garcia v. Gloor the Commission's language regulation identifies
English-only rules as potential variants of national origin
discrimination. Section 1606.7 also equates language restrictions
with other forbidden acts under Title VII by treating them as
possible allegations of disparate impact. Section 1606.7(a)
presumes that rules requiring use of English at all times violate
Title VII. Unlike Section 1606.7(b), there is no reference to the
business necessity defense that is normally available to defendants
in disparate impact claims. One could read the "All Times" rule of
Section 1606.7(a) as creating a conclusive presumption of
discrimination. The EEOC's commentary, however, seems to
indicate that the Commission envisioned that an employer would
281have a chance to defend its rule. Section 1606.7(b)'s "Certain
Times" rule, with its explicit reference to the business necessity
defense, fits more closely into disparate impact analysis.
Enforcement of the EEOC guidelines would place plaintiffs in a
strong position to pursue language claims under a disparate im-
pact theory. Yet claimants have been unsuccessful in persuading
courts to defer to the EEOC language regulations. This outcome is
hardly surprising. The easy path to judicial acceptance of agency
rules can be reduced to two words: Chevron deference. In Chevron
282U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court af-
firmed the principle that the federal courts should respect agency
regulations whenever Congress has expressly delegated rulemaking
power to the agency and the regulations are not "arbitrary, capri-
,,281
cious or manifestly contrary to the statute. Substantive regulations
concerning Title VII promulgated by the EEOC do not get Chevron
deference, since Congress only granted the EEOC power to make
278. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
279. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (2003).
280. See 45 Fed. Reg. 85,635 (1980) (discussing Garcia v. Gloor).
281. See id. ("[Tihe mere application of such a rule would shift the burden to the em-
ployer.").
282. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
283. Id. at 844.
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procedural rules. s4 At best, such regulations are entitled to Skidmore
2815
deference. The key factor is the rule's power to persuade. A court
credits an agency's experience and expertise in enforcing a statutory
scheme, and judges an agency rule by the "thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements....,,28
Skidmore, unlike Chevron, gives the courts wide latitude to accept
or reject an agency rule. Frankly, the Skidmore standards for thor-
oughness, cogency, and consistency provide so little guidance that
a cynical assessment of them is probably correct. Justice Stewart's
comment in Albemarle Paper that EEOC guidelines were "entitled to
great deference" has given way to more recent, restrictive applica-
tions, such as in Sutton. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Sutton
exemplifies the present Court's increasingly skeptical attitude re-
garding agency actions. A person is disabled under the Americans
with Disabilities Act upon proof that an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity. The issue in Sutton was the effect of
EEOC Interpretive Guidance indicating that corrective measures,
such as spectacles, should not be considered in the test for substan-
tial limitations. The Court dismissed the EEOC pronouncement in
two steps. First, it indicated that no agency was authorized by Con-
gress to issue regulations under the definitional section of the
ADA-a debatable conclusion,2 89 but sufficient in itself to wave off
Chevron deference. Second, the Court held that the EEOC's guid-
ance, whatever respect it might be owed, was a misinterpretation of
284. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2001) (granting EEOC "authority from time to time
to issue ... suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter").
See also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140 (1976) (holding that the EEOC does
not have general rulemaking authority under Title VII); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
285. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See also Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576 (2000) (holding that the agency's opinion letter lacking the force of law does
not warrant Chevron-style deference).
286. Id. at 140. See also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) ("As an
administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency, [EEOC sexual harassment
guidelines] constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance.") (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted).
287. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2001).
289. Id. at 514-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no evidence that Con-




the plain meaning of the statute in spite of legislative history in-
291dicating that Congress had contemplated the opposite.
Sutton's willingness to couple Skidmore deference with the plain
meaning rule spells trouble for those who wish to defend Section
1606.7. Courts wanting to avoid the effect of the EEOC regulation
can argue plausibly that the statutory term "national origin" does
not embrace language. 292 Even if we determine that "national ori-
gin" is an ambiguous term, resort to the legislative history does
little to promote the EEOC's position. As discussed in Subpart
A(1), supra, language concerns played no visible role in Congress's
sparse discussion of national origin discrimination. Judge
O'Scannlain's Spun Steak opinion, however, takes the analysis a
step further. Noting that a court owes no deference to a regulation
in the face of "compelling indications that it is wrong,"292 he faulted
section 1606.7 for upsetting the implicit balance between worker
rights and employer prerogatives. Specifically, he argued that sec-
tion 1606.7's presumption that English-only policies have a
disparate impact departs from the requirement that a plaintiff es-
294tablish such an impact to raise a primafacie case.
Judge O'Scannlain's criticisms of the EEOC rule have merit.
Statements that Congress intended to strike a balance between
worker and employer interests are too vague to resolve specific is-
sues convincingly. The observation that the EEOC is improperly
lightening the burden of plaintiffs is far more plausible. Under the
McDonnell-Douglas scheme for disparate treatment cases, the typical
plaintiff faces a rather minimal burden of establishing a primafacie
case. Ease of proof is tolerable since a prima facie case only taxes
the defendant with the need to articulate a neutral justification for
its actions. The burden of proof remains at all times with the plain-
tiff. A prima facie case under disparate impact, however, shifts the
burden of persuasion to the defendant. Imposing a higher eviden-
tiary standard on the disparate impact plaintiff, i.e., a showing of
actual and significant impact, is a reasonable precondition for shift-
ing the burden of proof to the defendant. Section 1606.7 undercuts
290. Id. at 482.
291. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (III) at 28 (1990) (Report of House Committee on
the Judiciary) (instructing that in determining whether impairment is substantially limiting,
it "should be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures ... would result in
a less-than-substantial limitation."); H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (II) at 52 (1990) (Report of
House Committee on Education and Labor).
292. See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 ("Nothing in the plain language of section
703 (a) (1) supports the EEOC's English-only rule Guideline.").
293. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489.
294. Id. at 1489-90.
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this procedural safeguard by putting the defendant to the proof of
business necessity on an unproved allegation of differential im-
pact. In dissent, Judge Boochever cast section 1606.7 as an
enlightened evidentiary rule, a tie-breaker that reflects the diffi-
culty of proving adverse impact and spares the court of hearing
"conclusory self-serving statements of the Spanish-speaking em-
ployees or possibly by expert testimony of psychologists."" 5 While
Judge Boochever's statements appeal to my view of expert psycho-
logical testimony as a commodity for sale on the market, Judge
O'Scannlain has the better take. The notion of a "tie-breaker"
seems inappropriate when disparate impact analysis is designed to
subject plaintiffs to a substantial evidentiary test before the burden
of proof shifts to defendants.
Section 1606.7 can likewise be faulted for finding impact when
there may be none. As discussed in greater detail, supra, Judge
O'Scannlain's analysis turned on the failure of the plaintiffs to es-
tablish that the English-only rule had a significant impact on them.
Allegations that plaintiffs were deprived of opportunities for cul-
tural expression and conversation in their language of choice were
insufficient since they involved activities to which they had no right
296in the workplace unless conceded by their employer. By reduc-
ing a prima facie case to an allegation of an English-only policy, the
EEOC rule implicitly creates cultural and linguistic rights that do
not otherwise exist. Section 1606.7 therefore improperly crosses
the border between equality and affirmative action. This expan-
sion of the statute is far too legislative to deserve deference. While
proposals to endow workers with such rights have considerable
297
academic support, these are not concepts that fit the equality
model underlying Title VII. I suspect, incidentally, that much of
the questionable testimony feared by Judge Boochever in Spun
Steak would relate to discomfort over lost opportunities for cultural
expression that are not covered by Title VII.
295. Idat 1490 (BoocheverJ., dissenting in part).
296. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1486.
297. See, e.g., Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of
RacialDualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1347 (1997) (criti-
cizing narrow application of Title VII to language claims); see also Mark Colon, Note, Line
Drawing Code Switching, and Spanish as Second-Hand Smoke: English-Only Workplace Rules and
Bilingual Employees, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 227 (2002). Juan F. Perea, English-Only Rules and
the Right to Speak One's Primary Language in the Workplace, 23 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 265 (1990)
(arguing that use of primary language should constitute a protected aspect of national ori-
gin under Title VII); Perea, supra note 72.
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In a similar vein, section 1606.7 can also be criticized for mixing
the concepts of disparate impact and hostile environment claims.
Section 1607(a) deems rules applied at all times to be possible in-
stances of hostile working environments. I would suggest that a
presumption of discrimination is even more inappropriate for
claims sounding in disparate treatment. Hostile environment
plaintiffs have the fact-sensitive burden of demonstrating that the
harassment was so "severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of
... employment."2
8
Perhaps one could rescue the EEOC's language rules by resort
to the practice of deferring to agency interpretations that Congress
has failed to correct. In United States v. Rutherford,2 99 the Court held
that there was no exception for the terminally ill under the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act's pre-approval requirements for
drugs. The decision turned in part on the failure of Congress to
alter a lontstanding Food and Drug Administration practice on
this point. Certainly one could argue from the Kennedy-
DeConcini dialogue that Congress was aware of the EEOC regula-
tion and therefore that the rule deserves the deference of
legislative acquiescence. At some point, however, the Rutherford
approach must give way when the agency interpretation is simply
wrong. Rutherford itself approved of administrative policies that
"comport[] with the plain language, history, and prophylactic
purpose of the Act."301 The recent Cline decision affirms this limita-
tion with its general statement that agency deference of any level
does not come into play unless judicial rules for statutory construc-
tion fail to reveal Congressional intent, and that no deference is
298. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (finding that Title VII reaches
harassment "so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
299. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
300. Id. at 554 n.10.
[D]eference is particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency's interpretation in-
volves issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to
correct any misperception of its statutory objectives. Unless and until Congress does
so, we are reluctant to disturb a longstanding administrative policy that comports
with the plain language, history, and prophylactic purpose of the Act.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (find-
ing that deference is owed when Congress refuses to respond to administrative
construction).
301. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 554.
302. Cline, 124 S. Ct. at 1248.
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owed when an agency's interpretation is incorrect.30' As argued
above, neither the plain meaning nor the legislative history of the
1964 Act show any intention to treat language restrictions as a
form of national origin discrimination. Congress's failure to re-
spond to section 1606.7 should have no more significance than its
failure to respond to the dismissed regulation in Cline.3 04In sum, the federal courts of appeal, as well as several district
courts,3 0 5 have properly declined to accept the EEOC's expansion
of Title VII. Recent opinions by district courts in circuits in which
the issue is open have shown a willingness to defer to the EEOC
regulations. These contrary opinions in part involve issues that
have been left open by the courts of appeal. A subject I will discuss
in the next section.
4. Open Issues-Spun Steak and progeny have left open two sig-
nificant issues. Specifically, these decisions have noted the
possibility that a different result might ensue (1) in cases where
languages restrictions were applied to monolingual workers, and
(2) where the rule was imposed at all times instead of selectively.
In his Spun Steak opinion,Judge O'Scannlain acknowledged that
an English-only policy might have a significant impact on a mono-
lingual employee. The issue did not arise in Spun Steak because the
plaintiff class apparently had a single Spanish-only employee to
whom the English-only rule applied. There were also factual dis-
putes sufficient to preclude summary judgment as to whether the
rule was being enforced against her or whether she objected.3 7
303. Id. ("[Wie neither defer nor settle on any degree of deference because the Com-
mission is clearly wrong.").
304. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 E2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting Section
1606.7 as an improper interpretation of Title VII); Long v. First Union Corp. of Virginia, 86
F3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished disposition), affirming894 E. Supp. 933, 940 (E.D.
Va. 1995) ("The EEOC's determination that the mere existence of an English-only policy
satisfies the plaintiffs burden of proof is not consistent with the drafting of the statute but is
rather agency-created policy. The plaintiff still bears the burden of showing a prima facie
case of discrimination.").
305. See, e.g., Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 14 F.Supp.2d 730, 735 (E.D. Pa.
1998) (holding that the EEOC Guidelines exceed the scope of Title VII); Prado v. L. Luria
& Son, Inc., 975 F Supp. 1349, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264
(5th Cir.1980)) (holding that English-only policies do not have an adverse impact on bilin-
gual employees).
306. EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc., 29 ESupp.2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999); EEOC v.
Premier Operator Services, Inc., 113 F.Supp.2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000). See also Roman v.
Cornell Univ., 53 F.Supp.2d 223, 236-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that a speak-English in-
struction may support an inference of national origin discrimination, although not case at
hand).
307. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488.
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Following Judge Rubin's lead in the pre-section 1606.7 Gloor deci-
sion,Judge O'Scannlain conceded that:
[N]on-English speakers cannot enjoy the privilege of convers-
ing on the job if conversation is limited to a language they
cannot speak. As applied "[lt] o a person who speaks only one
tongue or to a person who has difficulty using another lan-
guage than the one spoken in his home," an English-only rule
might well have an adverse impact.
3 0 8
O'Scannlain probably felt obliged to concede the point. His
logic that bilingual employees are not affected by language rules
because of their power of choice inescapably means that monolin-
gual workers cannot make such a choice and therefore suffer an
adverse impact.
It is tempting to conclude that Title VII should protect mono-
lingual employees. There are relatively few employees who speak
only a LOTE. Most were hired in spite of an obvious inability to
speak English, presumably because language was irrelevant to the
type of work done. A few jobs, such as assembly line work or food
processing, can be done without a word of English. Instructing a
Spanish-only speaker to communicate exclusively in English,
moreover, is tantamount to requiring silence and forbidding cas-
ual conversation. Because of their limited numbers, preserving
claims by monolingual workers are not likely to expand business
liability or litigation costs greatly.
Nevertheless, I would argue that Title VII cannot fairly be
construed to reach these claims. We should not let an
understandable sympathy for monolingual employees who must
trudge on in silence interfere with the conclusion that Title VII was
not designed by Congress to reach language claims. It is also
hardly clear, at least for purposes of a presumption, that imposing
an English-only policy on monolingual workers causes an adverse
impact in the legal sense required by Title VII. The court in
Synchro-Start, whose plaintiffs included a set of non-English
speakers, attempted to distinguish the rule in Spun Steak by noting
that the latter concerned bilingual employees.3 0 9 The difference
escapes me. Monolingual workers, or those with limited English,
obviously cannot choose to switch to English when they wish to
speak. But why should the lack of choice matter if there is no prior
right to have workplace conversations? The workers' lack of a right
308. Id. (citing Gloor, 618 E2d at 270).
309. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F.Supp.2d at 912-13.
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to cultural expression or language preference in Spun Steak is
simply one manifestation of the fact that workers lack expressive
rights generally.
Courts have also reserved judgment on English-only rules that
are applied at all times. Nearly all national origin litigation has ad-
dressed English-only policies that were applied selectively. The
English-only rule in Spun Steak, for example, did not apply during
breaks or lunch times.310 The rule in Gloor similarly excluded break
times.31 Neither court was willing to carry its holding beyond the
situation of a bilingual worker. Gloor left open the possibility of a
different result for rules that "forbade all use of any language but
English,"312 while Spun Steak opined that rules enforced in a "dra-
conian" method might amount to harassment.313 The issue arose inl  314
EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc., where the employer had
imposed a blanket prohibition on languages other than English.
The court was influenced by the fact the Spanish-speaking employ-
ees were subject to "oppressive monitoring ... even ... in the
lunch room or on a break,' 15 and that the policy served no appar-
316
ent business purpose.
I again fail to see the legal significance of the factual distinc-
tions. It is reasonable to assume that the plaintiffs in Premier
Operator, who were bilingual, would want to pass their break time
chatting in Spanish. The court's analysis improperly diverges from
Spun Steak's requirement that they demonstrate a "legal" impact
under Title VII. As grim as it may seem, the workers in Premier Op-
erator had no independent right to converse at all during their
break times. The fact that the language rule had no business justi-
fication should be irrelevant until plaintiffs demonstrate a
significant adverse impact. Ironically, characterizing the rule in Pre-
mier Operator as an "All Times" restriction was unnecessary for two
reasons. The court, relying on recent scientific research, rejected the
foundational conclusion of Gloor and Spun Steak that use of language
is a matter of choice for bilinguals (I'll return to this point just be-
low) .317 Second, there was convincing evidence of racial and ethnic
310. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483.
311. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266.
312. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
313. Spun Steak, 998 E2d at 1489.
314. 113 F.Supp.2d 1066 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
315. Id. at 1075.




animus on the part of the employer . 3 1 The claim could have been
better tried as a direct evidence case.
B. Language as a Changing Characteristic
If Title VII cannot be interpreted to reach language discrimina-
tion claims, should Congress amend the Civil Rights Act to include
them specifically? Any attempt to do so would be unwise. Lan-
guage claims lack sufficient similarity to race and gender claims to
fit Title VII's anti-discrimination precepts. There are two signifi-
cant points of departure. First, Title VII locates discrimination in
an employer's reactions to immutable characteristics. Yet, as I dis-
cuss in this subpart, language is remarkably mutable. Title VII also
presumes that no sensible employer could rely on traits such as
race or gender to make most personnel decisions. As I comment in
Subpart C, however, language is undoubtedly a relevant workplace
concern.
1. The Power to Learn a New Language-Immutable traits are a
key concern of the civil rights model because we think it unfair to
burden an individual with a group-based stereotype that he or she
cannot escape.1 9 As discussed at some length in Part III, supra, ra-
cial or gender classifications are treated skeptically in part because
they prohibit individualized judgments of people and subject them
to the economic and dignitary harms of bias. Language is different
from race, gender, or ancestry. We expect language capacities to
change over time. Monolinguals experience a burst of language
acquisition as children and, ideally, spend their adult lives refining
their verbal skills. Part II of this Article demonstrates that a similar
process occurs with immigrants to this country, who tend to ac-
quire competency in English within fifteen years of their arrival.
There are prominent examples of persons who were raised
speaking other tongues but became masters of English style. The
novelist Joseph Conrad, ne J6zef Teodor Konrad Korzeniowski,
was born in the Ukraine of Polish parents, learned French as a
teenager in the merchant marine, and then English at age 21. 320
His novel Heart of Darkness is a landmark of English literature, and
318. See, e.g., id. at 1071 (noting evidence of racial slurs).
319. See generally supra Part IIIA.2.b (discussing unfairness on relying of immutable
traits as a constitutional precept); Part III.B.1 (discussing unfairness on relying of immuta-
ble traits in Title VII context).
320. See3 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA: MICROPAEDIA 547 (15th ed. 1985).
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also was the inspiration for Francis Ford Coppola's film Apocalypse
Now. Henry Kissinger conducted realpolitik as well, if not better, in
English than his native German. Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth
Circuit was born in Romania, but has managed to become, in the
opinion of some, the leading humorist on the federal bench.'
Those with fond memories of Lolita should be impressed that Eng-
lish was Vladimir Nabokov's second language after Russian.
There also is a parallel tendency to lose touch with one's native
tongue when speaking a different language daily.
23
Professor Perea argues that although language is not immutable
in the same sense as race or sex, it is "practically immutable. " "'
Perea also takes issue with the conclusion in Garcia v. Gloor that a
bilingual's use of language at a given moment is a matter of
choice. His reasoning is based on studies of second-language ac-
quisition which indicate that certain Hispanics experienced
difficulties in learning English, and on papers postulating a variety
of sociological and psychological impediments to learning a sec-
326
ond language. Specifically, he points to one study indicating that
Mexican and Cuban immigrants experience difficulty in learning
E 327English, and another finding that half of Hispanic-origin resi-
dents over the age of 13 continued to speak Spanish as their
321. See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990) (containing
over 200 puns on movie tides); see also Humor Guide, The Syufy Rosetta Stone, 1992 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 457 (explaining puns in Syufy decision). See generally David A. Golden, Comment, Hu-
mor the Law, andJudge Kozinksi's Greatest Hits, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 507.
322. Ilan Stavans, What the Night Tells the Day: Book Reviews, 260 THE NATION 863 (June
12, 1995). Indeed, a surprising number of prominent authors have written outside of their
native languages, including Manuel Puig, Samuel Beckett, Isak Dinesen, Eugene lonesco,
andJorge Luis Borges. See id.
323. Of course no one forgets his native language. In reviewing scientific literature on
bilingualism, Professor Mirande remarked:
I was born in Mexico and came to the United States at age nine. My first and most
fundamental exposure to religion occurred in Mexico before I spoke English. Even
though I have good command of English and my vocabulary in English is more ex-
tensive than in Spanish, I find it impossible to pray in English. Whenever I go to
church (and it is not very often these days), or pray in another setting, I revert to
Spanish. I also find it very difficult to write poetry or express my deeper emotions in
English.
Alfredo Mirande, Now That I Speak English, No Me Dean Hablar ['I'm Not Allowed to Speak 7: the
Implications of Hernandez v. New York, 18 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 115, 137 n.145 (1996).
324. Perea, supra note 297, at 280.
325. 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980).
326. Perea, English-Only Rules supra note 297, at 279-84.
327. Id. at 280 (citing A. PORTES & R. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY: CUBAN AND MEXICAN IM-
MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 174, 180, 198 (1985) (finding that two thirds of men in
the study learned little or no English after six years)).
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primary language. He then observes, quite reasonably, that
adults and older adolescents have a harder time learning another
321language than the young. Perea points to several theories that
attempt to explain this phenomenon, ranging among the exis-
tence of a "critical period" in youth whose passing makes language
acquisition difficult,30 the difficulty imposed by "social distance"
between learner and the language of the dominant culture that
creates an unwillingness to learn, a "psychological distance" be-
tween learner and the group speaking the dominant language
caused by feelings of self-doubt and a failure of confidence in
132
one's ability to solve problems in a new language, and, lastly, the
effects of a history of discrimination against language minorities.3
Perea is correct that a person's mother tongue will normally
remain his primary language. Common sense, without recourse to
the social sciences, tells us that we will resort to our mother tongue
to express our most sophisticated, subtle, or intimate thoughts. It is
also obvious that, the older we are, the more difficult it is to learn a
new language. Beyond these propositions, I respectfully disagree
with Professor Perea's conclusions as they relate to language as an
immutable characteristic. People who arrive in this country speak-
ing a LOTE seem to have fewer problems with social and
psychological distance than the studies would indicate. As set out
in Part II of this Article, supra, data from the 2000 Census reveal
that immigrants now learn English, and that their children master
it. For practical purposes, any period of "practical immutability"
328. Id. (citing Grenier, Shifts to English as Usual Language by Americans of Spanish Mother
Tongue, in THE MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 346,
350 (1985)). Professor Perea also notes that this source concluded that Hispanics "are shift-
ing to English at a relatively fast pace." Perea, supra note 297, at 280 n.100.
329. Id. at 280-81 (citing, e.g., Seliger, Implications of a Multiple Critical Periods Hypothesis
for Second Language Learning, in SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION RESEARCH: ISSUES AND
IMPLICATIONS 11 (W. Ritchie ed., 1978); Whitaker, Bilingualism: A Neurolinguistics Perspective,
in SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION RESEARCH: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 21, 29-30 (W.
Ritchie ed., 1978)).
330. Id. at 281 (citing, e.g., S. KRASHEN, SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AND SECOND
LANGUAGE LEARNING 72 (1981); E. LENNEBERG, BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE
(1967)).
331. Id. (citing Schumann, Second Language Acquisition: The Pidginization Hypothesis, in
SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION: A BOOK OF READINGS 261-67 (E. Hatch ed., 1978)).
332. Id. at 282 (citing R. Gardner & W. Lambert, ATTITUDES AND MOTIVATION IN SEC-
OND-LANGUAGE LEARNING (1972); Schumann, Second Language Acquisition: The Pidginization
Hypothesis, in SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION: A BOOK OF READINGS 263-67 (E. Hatch ed.,
1978)).
333. Id. at 283-84. Perea does not cite a source or study specifically linking the history
of discrimination against language minorities to difficulty in language acquisition but seems
to infer such from the denial of educational opportunities to children from Hispanic and
other groups.
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will be confined to the immigrant generation itself.3 34 Within that
generation, there is a range of English language ability. Although
Census data are not as precise as we might desire, they do indicate
that only 4.2% of the population speaks English less than very well.
It is a fair inference, given that 11.7% of the population age five or
older are foreign born, that immigrants are achieving English
proficiency at a significant rate. Further, while English will not be-
come the primary language of most immigrants, many, if not most,
will learn sufficient English to function in American society. Lan-
guage simply does not have the qualities of immutability and
permanence that we attribute to race, ethnicity, or gender.
Viewing language facility as a changing quality knocks away one
of the legs of the civil rights model. Civil rights laws target immu-
table traits because we deem it unfair to hold a person to
assumptions about identity that he is powerless to alter. A race-
based qualification communicates a message that members of the
disfavored group are somehow inferior or less worthy than others.
On an individual level, racial restrictions rob the individual of his
chance to define his own worth and to meet neutral employment
standards. Language requirements in the workplace are different
from racial and like disqualifications. Without resort to stereotyp-
ing, they represent one of many terms of inclusion that an
employer may impose on his workers. To mandate that workers
speak in English or any other language during particular times or
at certain places in the workplace, if anything, is an implicit state-
ment that a worker and the linguistic minority to which he belongs
are capable of meeting a requirement. In this sense, language re-
quirements are no different from dress codes. 6 Moreover, the
power to comply with language requirements lies within the con-
trol of the individual worker. Remember that the primary
challenge of language policy in the workplace is bilinguality. As
noted, supra, nearly 96% of the population speaks English compe-
tently. In most cases, even workers who speak a LOTE have the
ability to comply with English-only work rules. So far as the civil
334. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (stating that 73.5% of persons who speak
English less than very well are foreign born).
335. Supra note 64, at tbl. 6.
336. See, e.g., Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. N.Y. 1981) (re-
jecting Title VII claim involving grooming code on grounds that corn-rows are not an
immutable, racially identifiable characteristic). The result in Rogers has, however, been
greatly criticized. Caldwell, supra note 247 (disagreeing with Rogers and arguing for protec-
tions for "intersectional" identities, such as African-American women); see also, e.g., Stephen
M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164
(1985) (arguing that Title VII should protect cultural traits associated with national origin).
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rights model is concerned, there is a difference between a sign that
says "No Irish Need Apply" and another that says "English Only on
the Factory Floor!" There is no loss of dignity or economic oppor-
tunity with the latter.
2. Code-Switching: Involuntary Reversions to Primay Language-
Central to the courts' rejection of language discrimination claims
under Title VII is the conclusion that bilingual workers may freely
chose to use English. Judge Rubin's statement in Gloor that "the
language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a particu-
lar time is by definition a matter of choice"3 3 7 is later quoted in
Spun Steak.3ss In both decisions, the bilingual's ability to chose
among languages countered any assertion that he had been de-
nied a privilege of conversing in a preferred language. To the
extent that a person can speak in English, he enjoys the same privi-
lege as everyone else and therefore suffers no disparate impact.
A recent decision has challenged the conventional wisdom that
bilinguals have free choice among their languages. The EEOC
presented expert testimony in Premier Operator Services, Inc.
regarding a linguistic phenomenon termed "code-switching."
3 39
The gist of this theory is that bilingual persons, particularly those
who grow up in bilingual environments, will tend to alternate
between languages. 340 Code-switching seems to have two distinct
manifestations. First, when interacting within their linguistic
community, bilinguals tend to mix languages, often alternating even
within the same sentence.34I An early study of Norwegian-Americans
by Einar Haugen found that bilingual speakers often crossed
languages unconsciously.3 4 2 A more recent example comes from
John Sayles' film Lone Star "Era muy cabr6n, that Charley Wade.",43
Code-switching also refers to a tendency among bilinguals to
337. Gloor, 618 E2d at 270.
338. Spun Steak 998 F.2d at 1487 ("It is axiomatic that the language a person who is
multi-lingual elects to speak at a particular time is ... a matter of choice.'") (quoting Gloor,
618 F.2d at 270).
339. EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 ESupp.2d 1066, 1066-1070 (N.D. Tex.
2000). The expert witness was Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, a professor of linguistics, Spanish
language and culture at the University of Pittsburgh. Id. at 1069.
340. Id. at 1070 (summarizing expert testimony).
341. Id.; see also SHANA POPLACK, SOMETIMES I'LL START A SENTENCE IN SPANISH y Ter-
mino en Espafiol: TOWARD A TOPOLOGY OF CODE-SWITCHING 3-5 (1979).
342. EINAR HAUGEN, THE NORWEGIAN LANGUAGE IN AMERICA: A STUDY IN BILINGUAL
BEHAVIOR 63-65 (1969) (discussing speakers' awareness of mixing languages); see also
Hans Dua, Perspectives on Code-Switching Research, 12 INT'L J. DRAVIDIAN LINGUISTICS 136,
136-37 (1984) (noting unconscious alternation between languages).
343. Margaret E. Montoya, Lines of Demarcation in a Town Called Frontera: A Review of
John Sayles'Movie Lone Star, 27 N.M. L. REV. 223, 227 (1997) (quoting Lone Star (Castle Rock
Entertainment 1995)).
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respond in the last language heard. The latter situation may occur
when a bilingual worker communicates to a customer in, saL
Spanish, and then addresses a supervisor in the same tongue.
345Gloor may well have involved code-switching. In either event,
code-switching theory regards shifts among languages as
involuntary, and not within the bilingual's power of choice. 346 The
significance of code-switching is obvious: to the extent that
bilinguals involuntarily revert to their primary language, their
behaviors resemble the immutable traits that fall within the anti-
discrimination model.
I am persuaded that code-switching theory has some merit.
There appears to be considerable acceptance of the idea withinS347
the scientific literature. I'm also swayed by personal experience. I
spent some time working as a graduate assistant in a Latin Ameri-
can bibliography center, where the language of work alternated
between English and Spanish, with occasional use of Brazilian Por-
tuguese. I can attest to the tendency of myself and my coworkers to
continue conversations in the language in which they began, re-
gardless of the individual's native language or level of competency
in others. While this anecdotal example hardly confirms code-
switching as scientific principle, and addresses only part of the
code-switching phenomenon, it does, in my mind, make reliance
on code-switching theory easier.
Let us then credit the theory of code-switching and move on to
the next question: should this linguistic "rule" alter our view of the
mutability of language for purposes of the anti-discrimination
model? My response is yes, but only at the margins. Code-switching
at best means that bilinguals in the workplace will lapse into their
native language under limited circumstances. Shifting between
languages will be infrequent in shops with language rules. Most
workers will be able to monitor their speech patterns most of the
time. While bilinguals may engage in language shifts unconsciously
344. See, e.g., Premier Operator Servs., 113 F.Supp. at 1070 (noting worker testimony of a
tendency to speak in Spanish after helping a Spanish-speaking customer).
345. Plaintiff in Gloor was hired for his ability to converse with Spanish-speaking cus-
tomers. He was discharged after responding to fellow bilingual employee's question
regarding a customer's request. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266. Gloor had a rule prohibiting em-
ployees from speaking Spanish on the job unless they were communicating with Spanish-
speaking customers. Id. The opinion is not specific, but it is possible that Plaintiff had been
addressed by his co-worker in Spanish, and likely that he had recently conversed with a
customer in Spanish. Id.
346. Id. (relying on expert testimony that "adhering to an English-only requirement is
not simply a matter of preference for Hispanics, or others who are bilingual speakers ....
[S]uch restraint can be virtually impossible in many cases").
347. See supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
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in unstructured conversations, it is unreasonable to believe that
work rules will not alter that behavior in most instances. Similarly,
the chances that workers will instinctively respond to a statement
or question in a LOTE are lower if work rules require English. The
chances rise, of course, when customers or other outsiders do not
speak English. In any case, most workers who speak a LOTE as
their primary language will be able to comply with an English-only
rule most of the time. Code-switching should result in occasional,
good faith lapses.
Permitting claims for adverse employment actions based on slips
of the tongue fits the civil rights model's focus on immutable traits.
A lapse into one's native language under certain, narrow circum-
stances can be viewed as an immutable aspect of one's national
origin. The question becomes how to design a cause of action nar-
row enough to cover such claims without allowing Tide VII to
reach instances of volitional behavior. Either the legislature, or
more likely a regulatory agency could fashion language that for-
bade adverse employer reactions to involuntary uses of an
employee's primary language. It would be difficult, however, to
design a system of proof that would distinguish with any degree of
reliability unavoidable lapses into a LOTE from voluntary or care-
less behaviors. Disparate treatment analysis is useless since it
depends upon an inference of discrimination derived from differ-
ential treatment. When a worker is disciplined for even for a single
instance of using a LOTE, there is rarely differential treatment
from which we could infer either good faith or improper motive by
the employer.
Approaching involuntary use claims through disparate impact
analysis also seems inappropriate. Workplace language rules are
broadly worded prohibitions requiring exclusive use of English at
all times or certain times. They can be applied to workers who for-
get to use English once, as well as to persistent-and presumably
willful-violators. A plaintiff could argue persuasively that lan-
guage restrictions disproportionately affect persons whose primary
language is a LOTE because of the bilingual's unavoidable ten-
dency sometimes to slip out of English. While disparate impact
analysis would indeed serve to invalidate rules that penalized
workers for unavoidable behaviors, its effects would not stop there.
Language rules that are properly applied against persistent viola-
tors are vulnerable to challenge because they also reach
inadvertent speech of other employees. Disparate impact analysis
runs the risk of converting a claim for inadvertent use of language
into a general claim against English-only rules, thus taking the
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claim well beyond the civil rights model's concern for inalterable
characteristics.
One could argue that the business necessity defense serves to
distinguish between volitional and accidental misuses of language.
Defendants might be required to show, for example, a system of
notice, warnings and progressive discipline that diminishes the
possibility of punishment for isolated lapses into LOTEs. Even so,
disparate impact analysis will not produce a good fit with the civil
rights model. A progressive discipline policy that permits discipline
after minimal violations, say a second instance of using a LOTE,
would do little to distinguish good faith impulses from willful
violations. As policies become more forgiving, for example by
delaying punishment until multiple violations have been reported,
employers would be disabled from reacting to avoidable violations
of a workplace language rules in order to protect the few cases of
good faith mistakes. Given that employers bear the burden of
proof for a business necessity defense, one can confidently predict
that they would adopt lenient discipline policies to better their
chances in court should Title VII be extended to language claims.
The effect of such practices, however, is difficult to reconcile with
the civil rights model's emphasis on protections of individuals
from bias directed toward immutable conditions. Requiring
employers to demonstrate business necessity will either facilitate
claims by persons who could have complied with English-only rules
or will discourage employers from enforcing rules that fall outside
of Title VII's proper reach. It also seems inappropriate to use a
disparate impact approach, which focuses on the effects of a rule
on a subgroup of employees, to resolve the highly individualized
question of whether a worker's use of a LOTE was intentional,
careless, or inadvertent. In any event, reliance on a business
necessity defense is unlikely to be effective and will prevent
employers from pursuing legitimate language work rules.34
At any rate, the present EEOC regulations cannot be applied to
reach involuntary uses and nothing more. There is language in
Section 1606.7 that seems compatible with code-switching theory.
The "All-Times" rule in 1606.7(a) declares that "the primary lan-
guage of an individual is often an essential national origin
characteristic"349 while the notice provision posits that "[i]t is
common for individuals whose primary language is not English to
inadvertently change from speaking English to speaking their pri-
348. See infra Part V.C (discussing employers' interests in English-only rules).
349. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2003).
[VOL. 38:1
Bilingualism and Equality
mary language., 350 Nothing in the rule or commentary, however,
evidences a specific awareness of code-switching as a linguistic or
behavioral theory. More important, the prohibitions in Section
1606.7 are aimed at preserving choice of languages within the con-
fines of business necessity, personal comfort and self-esteem
rather than protecting employees against inadvertent reversions to
their native tongues. The presumption against "All-Times" rules
kicks in regardless of any employee's ability to comply. Likewise,
the "Certain Times" rule requires a business justification for lan-
guage restrictions of any breadth. Ironically, the notice provision
can be read as rejecting the concept of code-switching. Section
1606.7(c) seems to regard notice as an adequate response to an
employee's tendency to slip into his primary language. Enforce-
ment of an unnoticed policy is considered evidence of
discrimination. By implication, the rule considers notice an ade-
quate cure. This is hardly consistent with code-switching theory's
insistence that language shifts are involuntary.
3. Language as an Evolving Cultural Trait-In the preceding sub-
sections, I have attempted to demonstrate that language lacks the
quality of immutability since it lies largely within personal control.
The individual power to learn English in most cases eliminates the
possibility that a workplace language rule will burden a worker
with an inescapable stereotype comparable to those created by racial
or gender conscious rules. Unlike the physical traits that we com-
monly identify with race, ethnicity or gender, language is one of
many cultural expressions or customs that evolve within national
origin groups. " The key difference between the two is that culture,
including language, changes in response to environmental factors
while essentially physical characteristics such as color are constant.
Cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker posits in The Blank Slate that
culture is a utilitarian phenomenon, describing it as "a pool of
technological and social innovations that people accumulate to
help them live their lives, not a collection of arbitrary roles and
symbols that happen to befall them."354 He observes that cultural
350. Id. § 1606.7(c).
351. Id. § 1606.7(a) (noting that all-times prohibitions prevent employees from using
language they speak most comfortably).
352. Id. (noting that all-times rules may create atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and
intimidation).
353. Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2003) (EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Na-
tional Origin) (noting that national origin groups have physical, cultural and linguistic
characteristics).
354. STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 65
(2002).
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practices change when societies perceive that new approaches of-
35fer a better way. Cultural practices, in brief, continue so long as
they help us.
Naturally one should expect particular national origin groups to
alter their linguistic practices when conditions demand it. Shifts in
language patterns of immigrants to the United States are a prime
example of cultural adaptation. Immigrants come to this country
with an expectation that they must learn English. A decision to
forgo English in favor of the language of their country of origin
would leave a newcomer in an untenable economic and social po-
sition. Predictably, as detailed in Part II, immigrants and their
families learn to speak English within three generations and then
use English as their primary language. Thus the immigrant group's
linguistic culture shifts to bilinguality in response to immediate
external needs. Eventually the original language fades away as as-
similation into American society makes it unnecessary. Even Will
Kymlicka, a prominent advocate of maintaining the societal cul-
ture of national minorities such as the Qu~bcois or the
Catalonians, treats immigrants as a separate case. He argues that,
except in the case of refugees, immigrants to America implicitly
accept participation in an English speaking society and it is, there-
356fore, not inherently unfair to expect them to do so. More to my
point here, Kymlicka acknowledges the practical constraint that an
immigrant's success in American society depends on adapting to
English speaking institutions.
357
The implication for the civil rights model is that employer re-
strictions which touch on ephemeral cultural phenomena rather
than truly immutable facts are far less likely to cause dignitary
harms. Anti-discrimination principles are deeply concerned with
protecting persons from the message that they somehow enjoy
lesser worth than others. The negative message is intensified by the
fact that the point of condemnation, such as race, is a permanent
and inescapable condition. The sting of a "whites only" sign beside
a restaurant door comes not only from a sense of exclusion today,
but also from the cold realization that nothing may change over
355. Id. at 66; see also THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURES: A WORLD VIEW 387
(1996) ("[C]ulture ... evolves under the stress of competing goals and competing cultures.
Cultures ... compete with one another as better and worse ways of getting things done
356. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 95-96 (1995). Kymlicka, however, argues forcefully that integration of immigrants
also requires positive steps to insure their welcome, such as enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws and cultural accommodations. See id. at 96-98.
357. Id. at 95-96.
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the generations. Insult is compounded by a sense of futility. In
contrast, a requirement that workers speak English takes place
against a background of linguistic evolution toward English that
each immigrant group to this county has voluntarily experienced.
To require that a worker speak English on the job in America says
far less about the worth of his national origin than the rule that
Catalin could not be spoken publicly in Franco's Spain. Although
restrictions against using LOTEs at work may strike some as deny-. 358
ing cultural worth, they also confirm commonly held
assumptions about assimilation into the larger society. The mes-
sage is at worst ambiguous and is perhaps better viewed as an
affirmation that new groups may participate in American society.
Language restrictions also tend not to convey messages of infe-
riority because languages are bad proxies for national origin or
ethnicity. In order for a language rule to degrade a particular
group, logically language must be an essential aspect of its national
or ethnic identity. Indeed, many scholars have argued that lan-
guage and ethnicity are closely related. Joshua Fishman, a
sociolinguist, argues that language is constitutive of identity be-
cause of its role as a central cultural symbol:
[L]anguage is more likely than most symbols of ethnicity to
become the symbol of ethnicity. [It] is the recorder of pater-
nity, the expresser of patrimony and the carrier of
phenomenology. Any vehicle carrying such precious freight
must come to be viewed as equally precious ... in and of itself.
The link between language and ethnicity is thus one of sanctity-
by-association.... [S]ince language is the prime symbol system
to begin with and since it is commonly relied upon.., to enact,
celebrate and 'call forth' all ethnic activity, the likelihood that
it will be recognized and singled out as symbolic of ethnicity is
great indeed.
358. See, e.g., Ruiz Cameron, supra note 297, at 1364-65 (arguing that Spanish language
is central to Hispanic identity).
359. Joshua A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity, in LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY AND INTER-
GROUP RELATIONS 15, 25 (Howard Giles ed., 1977); see also Henry L. Bretton, Political Science,
Language, and Politics, in LANGUAGE AND POLITICS 431, 434 (William O'Barr & Jean F.
O'Barr eds., 1977) (language facilitates development of social and economic relationships);
RALPH FASOLD, THE SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF SOCIETY ix (1984) (language identifies group
associations of speaker); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C.L. REv. 303, 351-52 (1986) ("[L]anguage is one of the 'symbol spheres' that
define social groups."); Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language,
23 Hous. L. REv. 885, 898-900 (1986); Comment, Native-Born Acadians and the Equality Ideal
46 LA. L. REv. 1151, 1167 (1986) ("Language is the lifeblood of every ethnic group.").
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I agree with Fishman that language is part of a complex of cul-
tural traits that define national origin or ethnicity at a particular
time. Saying "Me siento orgulloso de serJalisciense!" adds a layer
of meaning that the somewhat lame "I'm really proud that I'm
from Jalisco" can never achieve. My quarrel with the language-as-
culture theory is that it takes an unjustifiably static view of ethnic
or national identity.36° Ironically, the belief that cultures are in-
variably dependent on a particular language is a stereotype.
Cultures change as they adapt to new environments. This evolu-
tion, moreover, occurs both in immigrant and non-migrant
cultures. If language is truly the lynchpin of cultural identity, then
we should expect cultures to disappear or be drastically altered
once the underpinning of language is removed. Yet there are
many examples of civilizations that have maintained a distinct
identity even after losing their native tongues.
Consider Ireland. Gaelic there has been effectively supplanted
by English, although the Government has taken heroic steps to
preserve Gaelic by instruction in the schools. 361 Principal newspa-
pers such as the Irish Times are published in English. Many
leading works of English literature have been written by Irishmen
such as Yeats or Joyce. Even Sinn Fein speaks to the press in Eng-
lish. This is not to say that the passing of Irish has not prompted
much soul searching. There is a telling moment in Joyce's Portrait
of the Artist as a Young Man where Stephen Daedalus's preoccupa-
162tions with the English and Irish languages come to a head overthe word "tundish," which he took to be an Irish word for funnel:
I looked it up and find it English and good old blunt English
too. Damn the dean of studies and his funnel! What did he
come here for to teach us his own language or to learn it
from us? Damn him one way or the other!
360. Fishman, supra note 359, notes that the ethnicity is subject to change regarding its
content, group membership, and salience of characteristics, but concludes that ethnicity is
an abiding feature of humanity for which language is the chief symbol. Id. at 29-34, 42.
361. Dan Barry, Gaelic Comes Back on Ireland's Byways and Airwaves, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2000, at A6 (noting substantial increase in all-Gaelic schools).
362. Of the Dean of English Studies at Dublin, Daedalus says:
His language, so familiar and so foreign, will always be for me an acquired speech. I
have not made or accepted its words. My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in the
shadow of his language.
JAMESJOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 189 (Viking Press 1964) (1916).
363. Id. at 251.
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The irony is patent; the event or something like it was inevitable.
Still, no one would say that Ireland, except perhaps in the North,
lacks a distinctly Irish culture. Ireland's linguistic shift from Gaelic
to English represents the normal process of cultural evolution in
response to external pressures. Ireland would no doubt be differ-
ent today had Henry II not invaded in 1171. Perhaps the French
would have absorbed Ireland as they did Gaelic Brittany. The only
certainty is cultural evolution.
Closer to home, I observe a similar process occurring among
Hispanic36 immigrants to the United States. As noted several times
above, Spanish speaking immigrants live in a bilingual culture that
is likely to follow the established three generation transition from
native tongue, to English as dominant, then to English as exclusive
language. One can see evidence of the role that both languages
play in contemporary Hispanic culture. One the one hand, there
has been significant growth in the Spanish language press in the
United States. 365 Quality book stores, such as Borders or Barnes &
Noble, usually have a "Libros en Espafiol" section. Spanish lan-
guage cable networks such as Univisi6n or Gala are commonly
available on local cable or satellite systems. The renaissance of
Spanish media is easily explained by the large market of readers
and viewers for whom Spanish is their primary language.
On the other hand, expressions of Hispanic culture in English
are increasingly common. A significant number of Hispanic liter-
ary authors write in English. A few examples should make the
point. Many prominent Latino novelists, such as Julia Alvarez,
3s
317 368 369Ana Castillo, Denise Chavez and Sandra Cisneros write pri-
marily in English. Their works are translated into Spanish by
others. Richard Rodriguez's autobiography, The Hunger of Memory,
portrays the often wrenching alienation and difficulty of recon-
ciliation that he experienced while moving into the mainstream of
Anglophone society.3 0 The first line of the book is: "I have taken
364. This Article uses the term "Hispanic" guardedly. Newcomers from Mexico, Cuba,
and the Dominican Republic, to take just a few examples, are likely to have had different
experiences in their countries of origin. Thus, there will be cultural differences as well as
commonalities.
365. Perea, supra note 297, at 278.
366. See, e.g., JULIA ALVAREZ, HOW THE GARCIA GIRLS LOST THEIR ACCENTS (1991);
JULIA ALVAREZ, IN THE TIME OF THE BUTTERFLIES (1994).
367. See, e.g., ANA CASTILLO, So FAR FROM GOD 214 (1993).
368. See, e.g., DENISE CHAVEZ, LOVING PEDRO INFANTE (2001); DENISE CHAVEZ, THE
LAST OF THE MENU GIRLS (1991).
369. See, e.g., SANDRA CISNEROS, CARAMELO (2002); SANDRA CISNEROS, LOOSE WOMEN:
POEMS (1994).
370. Rodriguez, supra note 30.
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Caliban's advice. I have stolen their books. I will have some run of
this isle. ", 7 ' The subtle reference to The Tempest suggests in a pow-
erful way the situation of a man who has undergone cultural
metamorphosis. As does the fact that it was written, inevitably, in
English. The rules of cultural change apply in America as well as
elsewhere.
It is increasingly difficult to detect disapproval of work rules for-
bidding LOTEs when the cultural background is shifting toward
English. Most people would give a curious look to anyone who
suggested that a work rule forbidding LOTEs degrades the Fran-
cophone culture of Huguenot descendants in South Carolina, or
Swedish descendants in Minneapolis. The reason, obviously, is that
the assimilation of these groups into the so called "dominant soci-
ety" is complete. Assimilation is an ongoing process for national
origin groups that are newly arrived, such as Hispanics or Asians.
They are, nonetheless, subject to the same process of cultural as-
similation as any other wave of immigrants. To say that their
members must speak English at work, sometimes or even at all
times, does not necessarily convey a message of lesser worth. In
fact, workplace language rules have less and less to say about a na-
tional origin group as time passes and English becomes the
group's dominant, if not exclusive, language.
C. Language as a Relevant Workplace Consideration
The civil rights model assumes that characteristics such as race
and gender are essentially irrelevant to decisionmaking. We all
agree intuitively that, as a general matter, race or gender should
have no bearing on eligibility for government benefits, sentencing
guidelines, the right to vote, or the ability to perform a job. Lan-
guage, however, is plainly relevant to workplace decisionmaking.
No one would argue seriously that the ability to speak English is
unnecessary to most jobs in this country. Our business, commer-
• • 372
cial, and government culture is Anglophone. In the typical case,
371. Id. at 3.
372. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (striking down restriction on
instruction in LOTEs but affirming that failure to learn English hinders children from "be-
coming citizens of the most useful type and the public safety is imperiled"); Frontera v.
Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1220 (6th Cir. 1975) ("It cannot be gainsaid that the common, na-
tional language of the United States is English. Our laws are printed in English and our
legislatures conduct their business in English. Some states even designate English as the
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we expect that communication, recordkeeping, and client contact
will be done in English. There are exceptions. The plaintiff in
Gloor was hired because he was able to communicate with the
Spanish-speaking customers of a lumber yard.3" Yet even if the
ability to communicate in a LOTE is a job requirement, it is likely
that English will also be necessary (as it apparently was in Gloor) to
communicate with supervisors, to complete government reports,
and so forth. Occasionally employers don't care whether their
314
workers speak English . These exceptions, however, do not un-
dermine the general propriety of considering language ability and
use in the workplace.
Advocates of language rights agree that English is an important
component of the typical workplace. Professor Perea provides the
example of a Spanish-speaking sales clerk who refuses to speak
English to exclusively Anglophone customers, acknowledging that
the clerk is not doing his job. 75 The EEOC's tolerance of rules re-
stricting LOTEs at certain times (instead of all times) likewise
indicates that the use of English can be a critical ingredient in a
successful workplace . 76 The greater criticism is directed at rules
requiring the use of English at all times, arguing that such provi-
...... 
g377
sions lack business justification under Tire VII. I suggest that
even an "All Times" rule can play a useful, neutral role in the
workplace. Important benefits of such rules include avoiding dis-
ruptions among employees and facilitating supervision. Other
applications of an "All Times" rule provide marginal yet genuine
official language of the state."); Gerald P Lopez, Learning about Latinos, 19 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REv. 363, 405 (1998) ("English has long been the de facto national language.").
373. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269; see also Premier Operator Servs., 113 F.Supp.2d at 1068 (re-
quiring that telephone operators be bilingual to serve Spanish-speaking customers).
374. See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483 (noting that meat and poultry processor did
not require a knowledge of English as a condition of employment, that twenty-four of thirty-
three employees spoke Spanish of which twenty-two spoke English with varying degrees of
proficiency, and that two spoke no English at all). A knowledge of English in the Spun Steak
workplace was presumably less important since most of the work was done individually on
an assembly line. The employer's motivation for imposing an English-while-working rule
(i.e., while not on break or during lunch) had little to do with production: the employer
had received complaints that Spanish-speaking employees were making derogatory remarks
about African- and Chinese-American workers. Id. The employer believed that the English-
only rule would also enhance safety and communication with USDA inspectors. Id. These
added arguments, however, have the feel of something coming from a lawyer's office and
not a plant supervisor's desk. It appears that at least some of the foremen in Spun Steak were
bilingual. Id.
375. Perea, supra note 297, at 299.
376. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (2003) (permitting language restrictions at certain times
if supported by business necessity).
377. See, e.g., Perea, supra note 297, at 299-317; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2003)
(presuming that language restrictions applied at all times violates Title VII).
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utility, such as enhancing workplace efficiency and safety. I empha-
size that I am not arguing that such rules would meet the standards
for a business necessity defense under Title VII.37 s "All Times" rules
would often run afoul of a heightened business necessity test or
the plaintiff's power to suggest an alternative with less impact.
9
Such an analysis, however, presumes that language claims belong
in Title VII and that they fit within the civil rights model. I argue
instead that "All Times" rules serve rational goals independent of
racial, ethnic or national origin considerations. If rules requiring
use of English at all times are justifiable, then the less intrusive
"Certain Times" rules are, afortiori, rationally based.
1. Avoiding Workplace Disruptions-Maintaining harmony among
workers is imperative in any place of employment. A key element
in creating harmonious conditions is to avoid the perception of
secretive communications among employees. Individuals have a
well known tendency to feel marginalized, insulted, and even
threatened when they believe that others are talking about them
behind their backs. In an diverse workplace, there exists the spe-
cific possibility that Anglophones (of whatever race or ethnicity)
will perceive that conversations by coworkers in a LOTE are target-
ing them on racial or ethnic grounds. It is tempting to dismiss
negative reactions to conversations in another language as biased.
One scholar had argued that "It]here is no permissible reason why
two employees' private conversation in Spanish would be any more
disruptive than the same conversation would be in English," char-
acterizing reactions to such conversations as based on negative
feelings about the speakers of LOTEs. s° With respect, I suggest
that this viewpoint ignores a basic human tendency toward suspi-
cion of the unknown that cuts across all racial or ethnic lines.
Reactions to secret communications will be suspicious regardless of
language.
There are many instances where employers have imposed
English-only policies in response to actual or perceived uses of a
LOTE to create hostile environments. In Gutierrez, the Municipal
Court adopted a rule that its employees must speak in English
when dealing with the public. The Court was motivated by a fear
that employees might use Spanish "to convey discriminatory or
insubordinate remarks and otherwise belittle non-Spanish-speaking
378. Cf Perea, supra note 297, at 299-317 (evaluating English-only rules under Title VII
business justification standard).
379. See supra Part III.B.2.b (discussing the business necessity defense).
380. See Perea, supra note 297, at 305.
[VOL. 38:1
Bilingualism and Equality
employees." '' (There was apparently no evidence that such
incidents had occurred). The employer in Spun Steak adopted an
English-only policy in response to complaints that two employers
were using Spanish to make derogatory comments about African-
and Chinese-American workers s In Roman v. Cornell University, the
Plaintiff had been instructed to refrain from using Spanish after
coworkers complained that she was avoiding English to exclude
them from conversations. 384 In Kania, a Roman Catholic parish
adopted an English-only rule out of fear that non-Polish speaking
parishioners would feel excluded.' 8" In Long, defendants argued
that their English-only policy was inspired by employee complaints
that "plaintiffs were making fun of them in Spanish."3 6 Whether
the English-speaking employees' fears in these cases about the
content of conversations in a LOTE were well founded is
immaterial. Good management principles require that threats to
workplace morale be addressed. While language restrictions may
not be the only way to address such problems, they nonetheless
serve a neutral and highly relevant function by eliminating a
source of disruption in the workplace.
Professor Perea argues forcefully that workplaces which require
its employees to communicate in a LOTE are different.8 7 Sales
jobs, for example, may require that an employee deal with custom-
ers or clients in their preferred language. Perea argues that once a
LOTE is established, it is unlikely to be disruptive and will actually
promote cohesion in the workplace. 8
I agree that approaching customers in their preferred languages
is a good and often indispensable business practice. Interactions
with outsiders, however, have little to do with relations among em-
ployees. A monolingual employee is less likely to be suspicious of a
conversation in a LOTE between a coworker and a client than be-
tween two fellow employees. Thus, even in situations where LOTEs
are part of the working environment, English-only policies govern-
ing communications among employees bear a relationship to
promoting morale.
381. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042.
382. Id.
383. Spun Steak, 998 E2d at 1483.
384. 53 F.Supp.2d 223, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
385. Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 14 F.Supp.2d 730, 736 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
386. Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 942 (E.D. Va. 1995), affjd 86
F3d 1151 (4th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs in Longconceded that they had referred to coworkers in
Spanish because they "did not want others to understand what they were saying." Id.
387. Perea, supra note 297, at 301-02.
388. Id.
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2. Facilitation of Supervision-Restricting employee communica-
tions to English is also a rational method of improving supervision
of employees. At first glance, one might think that effective super-
vision could be obtained so long as managers and workers could
communicate in English about job-related matters. Under this
view, incidental worker conversations in a LOTE would be dis-
missed as irrelevant to the supervisory function.8' It is a mistake,
however, to take such a narrow view of workplace supervision. Ef-
fective management requires that supervisors know what
employees are saying and how they feel. Unless a supervisor is
multi-lingual, conversations in LOTEs tend to deprive manage-
ment of information that it needs to regulate the workplace.
Workers may have concerns about the competence of fellow em-
ployees or certain managers, ideas that would improve production,
or desires to unionize. They may also, as discussed in the preced-
ing section, be using a LOTE as cover for improper comments
about others. Permitting pockets of conversation in LOTEs creates
a risk that employers will be deprived of information that they
need to manage the often complex dynamic of the workplace.
While not every employer may find English-only policies necessary,
they-are hardly irrelevant.
3. Other Rational Applications-It is possible to identify other
applications of "All Times" rules as rational, even though their ac-
tual utility may be marginal. One can argue that exclusive use of
English in the workplace promotes safety, although the positive
impact of such a rule would probably be slight. Employees in-
volved either in emergency response teams or hazardous
occupations will normally be screened at the hiring stage for Eng-
lish proficiency as well as other communications skills. Rather, the
primary advantage of an "All Times" rule might be that an exclu-
sive English environment would improve the English skills of
workers whose primary language is a LOTE. Better English in turn
means that workers could be more responsive to English com-
mands in an emergency situation. While I doubt that the effects on
emergency response would be significant enough to lower insur-
ance rates, it would be wrong to dismiss the goal as irrational or
irrelevant.
A similar argument can be made that an "All Times" rule would
increase efficiency by raising the language skills of workers.
Workers with a better grasp of English are more flexible. For
example, they can more easily receive on-the-spot instructions that
389. See, e.g., id. at 307-10.
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allow them to do unfamiliar tasks temporarily. In-house training is
likely to be more efficient as the trainees' English improves. It is
also cost efficient for an employee to communicate with other
employees in one-language rather than two or more. Again,
although the benefits of enhanced English may be marginal, it is
not irrational for an employer to want them.
Adopting an "All Times" policy to support the use of English as
our national language may go too far. Defendants in Gutierrez ar-
gued that the ban on speaking English except to the public was
justified by the fact that the United States and California were Eng-
lish-speaking entities.3 90 Interpreting the business necessity defense
under Title VII, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument reasoning
that the Municipal Court's practice of serving the public in LOTEs
was at odds with a purported policy of promoting a single language39!
system. Even using the more lenient concept of relevance that
underlies the civil rights model, it is hard to say that using employ-
ees to promote a public policy initiative is sufficiently related to the
operation of a business. This is all the more so when the public
policy has not found expression in laws or regulations that require
or even prefer communication in English. Professor Perea won-
ders whether expression of support for national or state policies
can ever amount to a business justification of any sort.392 On this
point, I agree with him. The general utility of workplace language
restrictions, however, contrasts sharply with the assumptions of ir-
relevance that underpin the antidiscrimination model.
D. Do Language Claims belong in Title VII?
The civil rights model is a mechanism for defending equality in-
terests against biased actions. It targets decisions that are
improperly motivated by inalterable characteristics, whether in the
form of outright hostility or kinder-hearted stereotypes. As dis-
cussed in Part III of this paper, the anti-discrimination model is
based on several assumptions. Consideration of certain fixed traits
is unfair since individuals can never escape the disqualifying crite-
rion in spite of individual merit. Unfairness is compounded by the
fact that the trait in question is nearly irrelevant to sensible deci-
sionmaking. The model also recognizes that discrimination causes
390. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042.
391. Id.
392. Perea, supra note 297, at 306.
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dignitary injuries that are as serious as economic ones. Exclusions
based on immutable characteristics are not only unfair, they are
demeaning and leave an excluded person with the message: "you
are different and undesirable." Employer actions that are based on
fixed traits are bound to produce results that lack neutral, legiti-
mate underpinnings and are instead the product of bias.
Consequently, the Court has designed evidentiary tests, such as
heightened scrutiny for constitution equal protection claims and
the McDonnell Douglas framework under Title VII, that reflect a jus-
tifiable skepticism against decisions based on immutable traits.
Language simply does not fit the civil rights model. As I have
demonstrated in this Part of the Article, language lacks the essen-
tial characteristics of immutability and irrelevance on which our
anti-discrimination theories depend. If one can learn a new lan-
guage, then language is hardly an immutable characteristic. Issues
of fairness do not arise if the individual has the power to meet an
expectation that English be spoken. Compliance with such re-
quirements, moreover, serves as a means of inclusion into the
larger society, negating any demeaning message of inferiority. In
this sense, workplace language rules promote rather than interfere
with equality interests. The well established tendency of immigrant
groups in the United States to adopt English as their primary lan-
guage within three generations also belies the possibility that
language rules may affect a dignitary interest inherent in one's na-
tional origin status. Add to all this the fact that language rules
serve neutral legitimate functions in the workplace. It is simply un-
realistic to say that language restrictions should invoke the sort of
suspicion that we rightly feel when employment criteria turn on
race or gender.
Application of either of Title VII's inferential proof systems would
do little to separate mean-spirited English-only rules from legitimate
ones. Consider first the McDonnell Douglas system for establishing
disparate treatment. Assume that an employer discharges a bilingual
Hispanic worker for violation of an English-only work rule and then
replaces her with another bilingual Hispanic. The discharged
Hispanic worker will likely meet the criteria of being a member of
a protected class who was qualified for the job and has been
discharged. But will these facts permit an inference of
discrimination based on language? Hardly. Without more, it's
difficult to draw an inference of national origin discrimination
when the replacement worker belongs to the same ethnic group
and has the same bilinguality.
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If the replacement worker is different, say a white, monolingual,
Anglophone male, the inference of language discrimination is still
elusive. We might be justified in inferring race or gender discrimi-
nation under these revised facts. When applied to cases of race or
gender discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas test facilitates an in-
ference of discrimination by eliminating the most likely legitimate
explanations for a personnel action: lack of employee qualification
or lack of an available position. Of course there may be perfectly
legitimate reasons for the defendant's actions, but the suspicious
nature of the circumstances set against a history of discrimination
demands an inquiry into the employer's action.
In the case of an Hispanic worker replaced by a WASP after a
language rule violation, however, the same suspicions do not come
into play. Even acknowledging existence of code-switching, the
more natural presumption in this situation is that the worker was
discharged for failing to follow a policy. Unlike the race- or gen-
der-plaintiff, the situation of the language claimant is not
complicated by the fact that he cannot alter the trait upon which
the defendant is acting. Indeed, the plaintiff was hired in most
cases because he could speak enough English to perform the func-
tions of thejob. When one couples the fact that the typical plaintiff
has the capacity to speak English with the relevance of language to
workplace dynamics, it is difficult to view a discharge for violating
the language rule of the shop as being motivated by national ori-
gin bias. The lack of prejudicial motivation continues under any
conceivable combination of discharge and new hiring: the re-
placement worker of any ethnicity or national origin will normally
speak English, creating at best an inference that the employer val-
ues the ability to speak in a particular language.
One might argue that the language rule at issue is nonetheless
irrational or poorly fitted to the genuine requirements of the
workplace, and that it is unfair to the discharged worker. The
point has intuitive appeal. Most of us have held jobs in places that
were run bizarrely. Under the McDonnell Douglas mindset, however,
we don't require an employer to suggest a reasonable explanation
for its action until an inference of discrimination is raised. This
approach makes good sense. Title VII, and the antidiscrimination
model, are concerned with irrational practices, but only those that
can be linked to consideration of immutable characteristics. Irra-
tionality alone is perfectly legal, at least so far as Title VII is
concerned. To infer bias from irrationality turns the antidiscrimi-
nation model on its head.
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Adverse impact reasoning also offers a problematic method of
judging language discrimination claims. The essence of a Title VII
disparate impact claim is that the burden of complying with a lan-
guage restriction falls entirely on workers who speak a LOTE as their
primary language, and must therefore be justified by the employer.
As I argued in Part III(B) (2) (b), the disparate impact system fur-
thers the antidiscrimination model by excusing direct proof of
prejudice in circumstances where such evidence is hard to acquire.
Adverse impact claims are most valuable when there exists a possibil-
ity that employers may be acting, consciously or unconsciously, on
the basis of prejudices or stereotypes that have no relevance to the
workplace. The continuous history of racial and gender discrimina-
tion in this country rightly prompts us to be vigilant, all the more so
because the stubborn persistence of these biases is related to the
immutability of the defining characteristic. Blacks and Latinos can-
not become white by an act of will, nor can women as a practical
matter become men. Our fear that subtle biases will work to the dis-
advantage of protected groups is so great that, after an easily
established prima facie case, we require employers to demonstrate
business necessity to sustain the challenged rule. A rule that is in fact
unbiased may fail the business necessity test, yet we are willing to tol-
erate an over-inclusive approach because we fear that a less
protective test would be more socially damaging.
The utility of disparate impact analysis diminishes as circum-
stances indicate that a neutral rule is less likely to reflect bias or
irrationality. Such is the case with workplace language restrictions. It
is not especially significant that an English-only rule disadvantages
persons who speak a LOTE as their primary language, i.e., immi-
grants. Unlike the race- or gender-plaintiffs, who are as they are
forever, language plaintiffs have it in their power to learn English.
The fact of their employment is usually good evidence that they have
met an express or implicit hiring requirement that they speak Eng-
lish well enough to do their jobs. Nor does it matter that the
language claimant has better facility in a LOTE than in English. The
typically litigated rule is one that requires all communication to be
in English during prescribed hours. A worker can attain English pro-
ficiency that is adequate to meet such rules with without becoming
fluent. Language is a mutable characteristic. An immigrant's ability
to speak English increases over time while his racial or ethnic iden-
tity is unaffected. Thus, when an employer adopts an English-only
workplace regulation, there is considerably less reason to suspect
that it is responding to unstated, or subconscious biases, and in turn
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that such a rule reflects the irrelevance of ethnic or "national origin"
biases. Add to this the fact that language restrictions often serve a
legitimate function. To demand that employers point to a business
necessity for such rules inevitably means that some unbiased decisions
will fail the test, without the offsetting benefit that likely but difficult
to detect instances of bias will be screened out.
Once we consider claims brought by native born speakers of
LOTEs, i.e., the immigrants' children and grandchildren, the justifi-
cations for using adverse impact analysis on language claims
significantly weaken. Studies reviewed in Part II of this Article, as
well as Census data, indicate that the first native-born generation
tends to master English while the second prefers it to the family's
original language. There is no reason to think that a work rule re-
quiring persons fluent in English to speak English seriously burdens
them or makes a statement about their differences. The lack of a
substantial adverse effect implies that no hidden biases or stereo-
types are at work. If so, there is little reason to protect the post-
immigrant generation by providing them with an easily established
primafacie case that imposes a demanding business necessity justifica-
tion on employers. English language competence in the post-
immigrant generation also illustrates that the connection between
language and national origin evaporates over time. While members
of the immigrant generation will maintain a LOTE as their primary
language, this is not so of subsequent generations. Prohibitions on
workplace language rules will thus benefit a minority of persons who
claim a particular national origin. The limited effect on national
origin groups again implies that English-only rules are not so inher-
ently suspect that we can usefully subject them to disparate impact
analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, employer rules requiring that workers speak
only English do not tread on equality interests as they are defined by
American law. Workplace language rules, if anything, are a ruthless
application of the equality principle. Everyone in the workplace is
obliged to speak English at prescribed times and places. Nor do such
rules arouse the same suspicion as actions focusing on immutable
characteristics such as race or gender. The civil rights model that
underlies Title VII views such classifications warily and for good rea-
sons. Persons targeted by these tainted norms cannot escape them
and must bear the financial and emotional weight of being judged
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by standards that never make a meaningful difference. In a word,
they are "unfair." Language, in contrast, is not an inalterable trait.
People can and frequently do learn new languages. Bilinguals have
the power to restrict themselves to English in most instances. No one
suggests that language is irrelevant to the majority of workplaces in
the country. There is little reason, therefore, to try to fit language
discrimination claims into the equality driven vehicle of Tide VII.
Many readers may feel that closing Title VII to language claims is
nevertheless unjust. It is natural to have sympathy for anyone who
must undergo the difficult task of restructuring deeply ingrained
and long reinforced customs. We tend to regard idle workplace con-
versations as part of a private realm that employers should respect.
Many people would regard discharge for violating a language rule as
disproportionate to a trifling offense. Still others believe that cul-
tural expressions such as language should be protected from
employer discretion. These feelings, however reasonable, do not
relate to equality principles. Relief from the application of uniform
workplace language restrictions must reflect a decision to confer
positive rights on workers that exceed a baseline requirement of
equal treatment. Such a policy, moreover, would seem to require
either an amendment to Title VII or a new statute. There is little in-
dication that Congress, either in 1964 or later, intended to create
language claims under Title VII.
Direct Congressional examination of the language issue would be
beneficial. Courts are limited by the canons of interpretation to
divining Congress's intentions as expressed in the text of a statute,
and sometimes in the legislative history. Their power to consider
and balance larger social interests, such as the desirability of creating
cultural protections, is rightly limited. The legislative branch is also
unencumbered by the judiciary's responsibility to decide the narrow
dispute in front of it. Congress has the resources and the
opportunity to take a broad view of the proper balance between
cultural accommodations and the need for employers to manage
their businesses effectively. Much as Congress decided in 1964 that
employer discretions should yield to the precepts of equality
in workplace, it might now determine that principles of
accommodation should prevail for cultural expressions.
Accommodation is the prevailing model for federal disability law,
and, to a lesser degree, for claims of religious discrimination under
Tide VII. Perhaps accommodation should be the polestar light for
language claims. Congress, however, not the courts, should decide
the answer to this very important question.
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